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Humans are intrinsically motivated to avoid making mistakes in the workplace, yet 
human errors continue to occur. This research considered the problem of human error in safety-
critical workplaces that is often associated with damage to infrastructure, injuries or even death. 
The study began with a close look at prior research on established human error models, with 
particular attention given to a human error classification system that divides errors into skill-
based, rule-based or knowledge-based errors.  The review of the literature then examined the 
opposing organizational views of safety and how some humans are adapting or resisting the 
changes of the developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in their workplace, where 
nascent technologies fuse digital, biological and physical innovations. A research agenda 
delivered practical field research questions concerning human error and technology with a drive 
to uncover whether technologies help or hinder humans from making human errors in safety-
critical workplaces. The qualitative methodology that guided the field research consisted of 
reading incident reports, observing pilots and engineers and listening to them talk about 
technology and relay human error events in the context of a General Aviation (GA) private air 
charter business that also operated a flight school and aircraft maintenance repair. By focusing 
on the interfaces between humans performing high-consequence tasks and technology, this 
research re-examined the conventional human error model of skill, rule and knowledge-based 
error and considered adding another element connected to the high-tech world of work that 
humans face in future innovative safety-critical workplaces. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Over 1500 years ago the Greek philosopher, Plutarch, cautioned Errare humanum est, sed 
perseverare diabolicum which coarsely translated means, ‘To err is human, but to persist in error 
(out of pride) is diabolical’ (Hoffmann & Beste, 2015).  The US Institute of Medicine borrowed 
part of this quote for their report on patient safety in 1999: To Err is Human, which conveyed a 
clear message that humans make mistakes but they should not be blamed nor reprimanded 
(Donaldson, Corrigan & Kohn, 2000). In fact, out of all the safety-critical industries, the lessons 
of the medical and the aviation industries frequently receive great public attention as these high-
risk businesses often have an instant association to loss of human lives. Today, after multiple 
studies and documentation of new practices, human error is no longer seen as the leading trigger 
of an accident by many safety-critical organizations, but as a starting point to deeply investigate 
the root cause. This research delved into this perspective and then went further to reveal more 
information that leads to a better understanding of the interface of human intelligence and 
technology and how human error is perceived and managed in safety-critical organizations, more 
specifically in the aviation industry.  
Problem Statement 
Nowadays, even though humans are instinctively driven to avoid making mistakes in 
their workplace, are acutely aware of operational safety procedures and are purposely trained to 
work with equipment that is ergonomically designed to be safe, human error remains a 
significant priority for safety-critical organizations (Cook & Woods, 1994; Dekker, 2017; 
Hofmann, Burke & Zohar, 2017; Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet & 
Wiegmann, 2017).  
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A common illustration of how human error rates have not reduced over time continues to 
emerge in aviation studies. Since the 1950’s commercial, general and military aviation have 
experienced significant decreases in aircraft crashes with major advancements in technology, 
improved operating procedures, and training practices (Dekker, 2014; Nagel, 1988; Yacavone, 
1993; Weigmann & Shappell, 2001a; Weigmann & Shappell, 2003). Yet, while machine faults 
have reduced, accident rates associated with human errors have remained comparatively 
unchanged, with approximately 60 to 80 percent of aviation accidents still indicating that pilots, 
air traffic controllers and engineers have misapplied their skills, rules and knowledge (Dekker, 
2017; Ernstsen & Nazir, 2018; Garrett & Teizer, 2009; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2017). In 2003 
Boeing reported that the actions of flight crews were a major factor in the cause of more than 
60% of hull loss accidents compared to a low 4% related to mechanical faults (Boeing, 2003; 
Hobbs, 2008). Further, during the analysis of the accident, the machine error often turns out to be 
apparent, while the actions of the individual and the human element is somewhat more 
qualitative and indefinable (Weigmann & Shappell, 2001b; Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, 
Hackworth, Boquet & Wiegmann, 2017).    
Based on seven World Health Organization (WHO) regions there was an increase in fatal 
occupational accidents of 8% in 2014, estimating that more than 1000 people died around the 
world, every day in that year in the labor force (Hämäläinen, Takala & Kiat, 2017). In 2017, after 
three successive years of increases, 4,414 preventable work deaths in the USA were documented 
(National Safety Council, 2017). The collective cost of those deaths and 4.5 million people 
receiving work injuries was estimated at $161.5 billion which included wage and productivity 






While it is unreliable to attach these figures solely to human error, 85% of all nonfatal 
injuries were associated with imperfect human functioning such as fatigue, overexertion, slips, 
trips and falls (National Safety Council, 2017; Yong, Lie & Calvert, 2017). 
Human ideals, actions and behaviors are influenced by their emotions. Humans 
daydream, forget procedures, feel apathetic, grow careless, become overly confident, get sick, 
become exhausted and sometimes even act recklessly. Regrettably, these are some of the 
undesirable characteristics of humans who perform critical tasks in the taxing settings of safety-
critical industries today.   
While automation is beginning to either support or completely remove the human from 
their critical tasks, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to execute some tasks that go 
beyond what humans can do (Manyika & Sneader, 2018).  In fact, globally, major innovations in 
technology will mean Human Resource Development (HRD) practitioners from either inside or 
outside of the safety-critical organizations will need to support humans adapting to these 
complex transformations to improve performance in a changing workplace (Cummings & 
Worley, 2014). Perhaps at no other time has Organization Development (OD) been more 
practically relevant to organizations’ especially those that need to operate safely in a highly 
complex and evolving world. As opposed to supervising the overall safety of a safety-critical 
operation in order to efficiently and cost-effectively transform that labor into a lucrative good or 
service, OD offers HRD practitioners, who can genuinely support humans to relate more 
effectively to their tools, tasks, team, organization and their whole environment.  
The purpose of this study was to explore in depth the occurrence of human error in 





To what extent do technologies help or hinder humans who make human errors in safety-
critical workplaces?  
The study was guided by three additional sub-questions that helped to set the context for 
the overall inquiry.  
The sub-questions were: 
1. What types of errors do humans make when performing high consequence tasks? 
2. How does technology address those different types of human errors? 
3. How does the safety-critical organization address those different types of human errors?  
 
Significance of the Problem  
 When a human error occurs in a safety-critical organization, a common reaction has been 
to view it as a moral problem and search for the individual bad apple/s that instigated the 
disaster.  Various countermeasures to monitor and modify those undesirable behaviors of those 
individual offenders are sometimes implemented in safety-critical organizations such as; safety 
poster campaigns, lengthy prescribed checklists, strict operational procedures, harsh disciplinary 
measures, intimidating social pressures of naming and blaming, warnings of litigation and re-
training (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). However, blaming and shaming an individual does not entirely 
solve the problem of human error and often times the error is covered up in fear of being 
reprimanded or even worse the same error continues to occur (Dekker, 2011). Instead of 
emphasizing the individual human failings this study will draw attention to how the social 
arrangements within the organizations are systematically linked to the features of the human’s 
tools, tasks, and the context of their specific operating environments (Dekker, 2017; Von 





Some safety-critical industries are investing in technologies to release the human from 
their dangerous and repetitive tasks and to handle complex work flows under time pressure 
(Chui, 2017).  Wearable technologies, robotics and autonomous vehicles, virtual assistants, 
computer vision and machine learning have seen technology companies increase expenditure on 
AI, spending up to $30 billion in 2016, with the largest share on machine learning (Chui, 2017).  
Furthermore, some forerunners in the technology industry advocate decreasing human 
intervention or even erasing the human from the dangerous work setting entirely.  One solution 
to reducing risk with emerging technologies is using Robotic Process Automation (RPA) that 
performs rule based, repetitive tasks but more importantly makes no mistakes (Moffitt, Rozario 
& Vasarhelyi, 2018).  To add to the complexities of the evolving technological workplace, there 
is also a niggling, pervasive public opinion that these new technologies will strip humans of their 
livelihoods, steal their privacy, strengthen corporate power and enable corporate spies (Chui, 
2017; Shin & Prabhu, 2018; Tran, Behrend, Fünning & Arango, 2018).  
So, this study considered the different types of human errors that were occurring, the 
types of technologies humans were adopting to buttress themselves while performing critical 
tasks and how well the safety-critical organization supported the human in that workplace.  
Conceptual Framework 
The McKinsey Global Institute declare that today half of all work activities are 
technically automatable and estimate by 2030 the displacement of 800 million workers 
worldwide from automation (Manyika, et al., 2017).  In the future, safety-critical organizations 
will have to start to ascertain how humans can acclimatize more easily to these nascent and 
evolving devices (Simões, Soares & Barros, 2019; Timms, 2016). While I believe that these 





as it becomes even more judicious for them to develop those special human competencies that 
are harder for technologies like AI to emulate and replicate.  
Upon reading, Joseph Aoun’s (2017) Robot Proof, I found a theoretical framework 
described as “humanics” which reflects my personal belief that knowledge alone is simply not 
enough for our future workplaces. Humans are uniquely intelligent and have the capacity to 
outperform some technologies and accomplish some exclusive tasks.  For example, humans have 
the ability to understand a machine holistically, are entrepreneurial, possess cultural dexterity in 
a complex global world and possibly the most notably, are able to deliberate over problems 
critically (Aoun, 2017).  
This conceptual framework is the scaffold that holds all of my primary research questions 
and design decisions together and has driven me to collect a rich description of the participants 
by “…understanding the world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it…” 
(Schwandt, 1998, p.221). My research goal was to offer a rich, ‘thick description’ of those 
unique humans who perform high consequence tasks in a safety-critical setting (Geertz, 1973).   
Limitations of the Study 
The majority of examples of human error, offered in the subsequent literature review, 
were largely drawn from the aviation, maritime or medical industries.  Therefore, it cannot be 
demonstrated that the concepts and models presented in this study based in the GA industry are 
as pertinent or clearly transfer to other specific settings within other safety-critical industries 
such as ambulatory care, nuclear power plants, off-shore oil platforms, chemical plants, and 
transportation, where safety is also a significant priority.   
Furthermore, this study was undertaken with a small, specialized group of aviation 





GA setting out of a secondary airport. This means, that while the chosen safety-critical business 
conducted critical tasks and held commercial operations of charter, training and aircraft hire, in 
comparison to large-scale commercial passenger and freight airlines in Australia and globally, its 
relative capacity to use or source emerging technologies was insignificant. So, understandably 
the specific data that I collected cannot be oversimplified to apply to all humans who perform 
high consequence tasks in every safety-critical industry.   
Finally, while this research draws attention to the interaction of humans with technology, 
focusing more on human error, there was no effort in the study to look at the inverse concern of 
machine error and the impact that has on humans. The ethical and legal implications for the 
manufacturer of the machine, the safety-critical organization that makes the decision to procure it 
and the human who operates a machine that makes a critical error will be purposely overlooked 
in the context of this human error research.  
Definitions of the Terms  
Human Errors: are unintentional or undesirable actions or decisions by a human.   
Human Factors: human factors (also known as ergonomics) is the study of how humans behave 
physically and psychologically in relation to particular environments, products, or services.  
Just Culture: emphasizes that errors are an outcome of faulty organizational cultures, rather than 
solely brought about by the individual, “What went wrong?” is asked after an incident. 
Knowledge Based Errors: occur when the human fails to remember information or the 
organization fails to provide correct  
Lapses: are failures of the human to remember - for example, forgetting the overall objective of 
the task, or forgetting steps in a procedure. 





Rule Based Errors: occur when the human fails to follow an effective rule or the organization 
fails to issue an effective rule 
Safety-critical industries: are industries where the consequences of failure or malfunction may be 
loss of life or serious injury, serious environmental or property damage.  
Skill Based Errors: occur when the human fails to pay attention (slips, trips, falls) or the 
organization fails to provide sufficient resources   
Slips: are failures of execution or control usually due to lack of attention - for example, reversals, 
mis-ordering, mistiming, interference errors, perceptual confusions. 
Workplace Accidents: are events of the worst occurrence with at least one human fatally or 
seriously injured. 






CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the phenomenon of human error occurring in 
safety-critical industries. This chapter offers previous research undertaken of human error, 
preserving some relevance largely to the interests of safety-critical industries such as aviation 
and medicine.  An explanation of safety-critical organizations, a definition of human error and 
some human error classifications, models and theories are presented, as a foundation to describe 
two organizational views of handling human error.   Then, this literature review transitions into 
the topic of future safety-critical workplaces and how humans will need to adapt to emerging, 
disruptive innovative technologies.  
Defining Safety-critical Organizations 
Safety-critical organizations are defined as those highly regulated businesses in which the 
well-being of humans is an overriding concern to the organization. If a disaster occurs then 
serious environmental destruction, severe damage to property, grave injury to humans or even 
loss of a significant number of lives can potentially occur (Wears, 2012). Safety-critical 
industries that are most commonly cited in the literature are aviation, healthcare, nuclear power 
plants, off-shore oil platforms, chemical plants, military, rail transport and construction (Edkins, 
2002; Kletz, 2008; Lee & Harrison, 2000; Rothblum, 2000; Wears, 2012).   Life-critical systems 
are distinct because the humans working within those systems are performing high consequence 
tasks and have a higher probability of making a human error that results in a system to 
malfunction (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a).   
There are two terms exclusively associated to how safety-critical organizations are 





working within those life-critical systems appreciate that an inordinate number of people have 
the potential to be killed or injured simultaneously in their workplace.  With respect to mass, 
large commercial airlines who own and operate the new generations of wide body passenger 
aircraft, are one of the most visible safety-critical organizations who recognize mass.  A reluctant 
yet factual illustration of plausible number of fatalities, are the large airborne constructions of the 
Airbus A380, which in a standard two-class configuration can hold up to 544 humans and the 
Boeing 747 which can also transport up to 524 humans (Mason, 2007). In 1985, Japan Airlines 
Flight 123 crashed a Boeing 747SR, chronicling 520 as the highest number of fatalities in 
aviation history, involving one aircraft (Haruta & Hallahan, 2003).  Nevertheless, a human 
working on or near a large passenger aircraft, might demonstrate a strong sense of the 
consequences of their actions, however that heightened sense of looming death is problematic to 
sustain on a daily basis, as interruptions occur, distractions set in and humans are prone to 
complacency.  
The second expression, dread means that some humans both inside and independent of 
safety-critical industries, also naturally anticipate certain levels of impending mortality and 
dangers to themselves or others with some apprehension or even great fear.  An example of this 
level of anxiety or even panic is exhibited in the consumer who purchases a seat on a commercial 
airline and then with justification, places immense pressure on the safety-critical organization to 
meticulously manage all the risks inherent in both the technology they use and the humans that 
work directly on or around the aircraft.  
Defining Human Error  
After a major incident or accident occurs, a newsflash sometimes mentions that 





it is an aircraft accident, the news report sometimes vaguely indicates the root cause of the 
accident by declaring whether it is a pilot or mechanical fault or sometimes both.  The very 
nature of humans is to inquire and even demand to understand the reasons behind a disaster and 
this is generally expected in society, so lengthy investigations are launched.   
Yet, while the term human error may hold some weight to explain simple scenarios 
describing a human was somehow involved in an event and they have either not executed or 
planned an activity successfully, there has been little agreement on a clear-cut meaning of this 
expression over the last century (Fitts & Jones, 1947; Hollnagel, 2004; Illankoon & Tretten, 
2019).  In Fitts and Jones’s (1947) research on pilot error they argued that human errors were 
simply an indication that there were other problems in the system and placed quotation marks 
around the word error. This denoted that human error was seen as an event that the human 
experienced with the machine, so it made more sense to recommend changes to the environment 
rather than to reprimand the pilot.  Over seventy years later, Dekker (2017) followed Fitts and 
Jones’s (1947) philosophy and placed quotation marks around the whole term ‘human error’ 
clearly representing that the label literally fails to justly explain the wider view of the human 
working in the multi-faceted context of a hazardous safety-critical workplace.   
Furthermore, what is seen as human error to one human may be defined as standard 
procedure to another who has an entirely different world view.  As an example, in one study of 
two groups of humans counting errors of air traffic controllers (ATCs), the definitions of an error 
were vastly different (Hollnagel & Amalberti, 2001).  The ATCs were the subject matter experts, 
guided by the experience, insight and context in their field and overlooked some of the mistakes 
as genuine human errors because they regarded the ATCs as engaging and adapting to the 





The experts viewed the humans as doing the best they could under the circumstances, 
considering their tools, time and tasks. Over the last twenty years safety experts have banded 
together to agree that using the term human error to explain such complex systems like aircraft 
accidents is problematic (Dekker, 2006; Hollnagel & Amalberti, 2001). To demonstrate a new 
image of human error, Hollnagel (1993) retitled it performance variability with an 
acknowledgement that adjustments in performance are required at both the individual and the 
organizational level. 
However, while this universal, widely-used term has been either mis-understood, 
disregard, or renamed, human error is most commonly approached by safety-critical industries in 
two different ways; as either an unintentional error or a deliberate violation as shown in Figure 1 
(Embrey, 2005; Rasmussen, 1982; Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a).   
 
Figure 1. Two forms of Human Failure, adapted from Human error, by J. Reason, 1990, 
Cambridge University Press. 
A definition of violations is presented in this paper for the purposes of understanding 
where human error is positioned within the two very different circumstances of either inadvertent 




















according to their own personal or professional judgement, which involves them consciously 
ignoring a recognized procedure to deliberately defy the rules this is considered a violation in 
safety-critical industries (Rasmussen, 1982; Reason, 2016).   There are three types of violations; 
deliberate, situational, exceptional. Deliberate routine violations, usually take place at the skill-
based level and commonly occur when humans follow an undesirable organizational norm or a 
harmful short-cut that exists within their safety culture (Rasmussen, 1982).  Situational violations 
usually occur when there is a lack of resources, an increase in pressure on humans to fill the gap, 
to retain employment or an incentive to meet a target.  The least common disruption is the 
exceptional violation which involves unique actions by humans who make a conscious decision 
to act instinctively in an extraordinary situation, usually when equipment fails or in emergencies 
(Rasmussen, 1983). While in the broader scope of the topic of human error, it is important to 
understand violations, this literature review and subsequent field research purposely only focused 
on the unintentional errors related to the misapplication of skills, rules and knowledge of the 
human.  
Classification of Human Errors. 
 Nearly forty years ago, a taxonomy of human errors known as Skill, Knowledge, Rule 
(SKR) was offered as a valuable framework for identifying and classifying the different types of 
error as shown in Figure 2 (Rasmussen, 1982; Rasmussen & Goodstein, 1988; Reason, 1990).  
Even though, this arrangement might be regarded as far too timeworn and unsophisticated to 
capture all the facets and complexities of how humans make mistakes, it is still a worthwhile 






This SKR system of errors is divided into two distinctive failures of the human; execution 
and planning failures.  If a human forgets to put something in the correct order or skips a step in 
the procedure, it is labelled a skill-based error because the human clearly has failed to execute or 
physically perform the critical task acceptably.  The most common errors stem from skills-based 
errors which tend to occur when the human possesses the correct skills, is highly experienced 
and is very familiar with the routine and rules but unintentionally slips (Rasmussen, 1982; 
Salminen & Tallberg,1996).  Missing a step, pressing the incorrect button, loosening something 
instead of tightening it or any action that is performed on autopilot by the human are 
representative of skills-based errors in aircraft maintenance or air charter safety-critical 






Figure 2. SKR Classification of Human Errors, adapted from “Human errors. A taxonomy for 
describing human malfunction in industrial installations,” by J. Rasmussen, 1982, Journal of 
occupational accidents, 4(2-4), 311-333. 
While slips are skill-based errors that occur when the human is being careless or not 
paying attention, lapses occur as a result of memory failure (Cak, Say & Misirlisoy, 2019; 
Rasmussen, 1982; Reason; 1990). Trials of the limits of humans memory span in the 1950’s 
demonstrated that the longest list of items a human can recall is seven and this formed Miller’s 
Law or the Magical Number Seven plus or minus two (Miller, 1994).  Additionally, safety 
critical organizations have become well-known for the use of checklists to overcome the concern 
SKILLS KNOWLEDGE RULES                                       





SKILLS         
BASED ERRORS 
SLIPS & LAPSES 












of memory failure and routinely use them to impart greater adeptness, constancy and safety in 
their workplaces as humans manage critical tasks under time pressure (Gawande, 2010).  
If a human is unaware of a rule associated with their critical task or misuses the rule by 
adopting an adverse norm from the workplace, then this is considered a rule-based error and is 
viewed as a human unsuccessfully planning to fail.  Safety critical organizations realize that 
errors made due to inadequately trained humans who do not know the rules or misuse an 
ineffective rule can be disastrous and seek out competent people through rigorous recruitment 
practices because those effective humans are the ones who, “... can create valuable results 
without excessively costly behavior…” (Gilbert, 1996, p. 17).  Similarly, if a human enters a 
safety-critical workplace to perform a task with marginal or incomplete information about how 
to execute the critical task this too is viewed as a lack of training and a planning failure on the 
part of the human.   
Human Error Models. 
Over the last century safety-critical organizations have applied various human error 
models to both contain risk and explain human error in their businesses (Woods, Dekker, Cook, 
Johannesen & Sarter, 2010).  In this next section, three accident models and one theory 
commonly referred to across safety-critical industries are briefly described. These are (a) 
Domino Model, (b) Barrier (Swiss Cheese) Model, (c) Drift Model and (d) Systems Thinking.  
The Domino Model, as shown in Figure 3 originates from Heinrich’s research nearly a 
century ago (1941) with his famous coining of the phrase unsafe acts.  While the model offers 
some investigative advantages because it is easy to plot a narrative along a timeline, the idea of 
placing blame on individual humans who have tendencies to be accident prone, has been largely 






Figure 3. Domino Model of Accident Causation, adapted from Industrial Accident Prevention. A 
Scientific Approach, by H.W. Heinrich, 1941 
In direct comparison, the Barrier Model, sometimes known as the Swiss Cheese Model, 
as shown in Figure 4, identifies accidents as active errors committed by those humans working 
on high-consequence tasks (Hollnagel, 2016; Reason, 1997). However, this model goes further 
by concentrating on destabilized organizational conditions that conceal dormant errors within 
organizations. The Drift Model, also born in the 1970’s, was really the first model to focus on 
explaining the incremental nature of drifting into accidents when humans start to make minor 
departures from operational procedure (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughn, 1996, 1999; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).  However, the model has received criticism as it is unreasonable to 
demand that humans remain constantly uneasy about impending disaster and also requires 
































Figure 4. Barrier (Swiss Cheese) Model, adapted from Human error, by J. Reason, 1990, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Systems Theory or Systems Thinking is positioned separately from these three accident 
models as it does not rely on a linear cause-effect relationship to explain how accidents occur 
(Dekker, 2017).  The main aim of System Theory as shown in Figure 5, is to “…explain things, 
natural or artificial, as that of systems and the interplay of their respective constituent parts” 
(Jacobs, 2014, p.22).  In a safety system the machines and human resources are the inputs, how 
the organization uses those resources is the processes and the results are the outputs.  If there is a 
fault feeding forward mechanism to support changes to the way humans and machines interact 
then the process is repeated.  Systems Theory focuses on the whole and accidents are treated in 
their entirety, built on two central positions, emergence and control (Leveson, 2011).  The 
emergent property that results from the process is safety, which can only be defined by how the 
humans and the processes are interacting with each other.  The control component imposes 
restrictions on the degrees of autonomy and freedoms that the human can manipulate within that 





Within their particular safety systems, safety critical organizations make important 
decisions on how to distribute and coordinate work into different departments and support 
strategic directions based on a systems theory that underlies most of Organization Development 
(OD) called the “open systems model.” (Cummings & Worley, 2014).  Even more significantly, 
with respect to Human Resource Development (HRD) safety critical organizations endeavor to 
connect the humans to their critical tasks. OD approaches for managing technological issues 
comprise OD activities involving employee involvement and work design and are called 
“technostructural interventions” (Cummings & Worley, 2014, p.154). 
 
Figure 5. Basic Components of Systems. Adapted from System Theory and HRD, by R. Jacobs, 
2014. In Handbook of Human Resource Development (eds, N. E. Chalofsky, T. S. Rocco and M. 
L. Morris).  
 
When the development, design and operation of the whole system is closely examined by 
distinguishing the parts from the whole and then assembled together again in a novel way, then a 
clearer breakdown and analysis of how human error has occurred can emerge (Jacobs, 2019). 









designs but as dynamic social processes with humans constantly acclimatizing to achieve 
objectives in a shifting socially organized system.  
Organizational Views of Human Error.  
There are two distinct approaches of studying human error in organizations; the person 
and the system approach as shown in Table 1(Dekker, 2017; Reason, 2016). The person 
approach observes the human performing a dangerous act or investigates a human error incident 
and immediately brands the human as forgetful, careless or inattentive or even negligent. While 
this somewhat traditional perspective of safety maintains that problems are due solely to humans 
not following the rules, the system approach appreciates that humans are imperfect and flawed.   
Table 1. Person Approach vs System Approach 
Person Approach to Human Error                   System Approach to Human Error  
Humans seen as a problem to control       Humans seen as resource to harness 
Focus on humans’ attitudes and behavior           Focus on humans’ working conditions 
Absence of incidents/injury free                         Presence of positive capacities        
Safety manager decides                               Experts decide 
Guided by rules & compliance                   Guided by insight & context  
Governed by process & bureaucracy                  Adjusted for mutual coordination 
Strives for predictability & standardization        Strives for diversity & innovation  
Safety managed upwards                               Safety managed downwards  
Note. Adapted from Dekker, S. (2017). The field guide to understanding 'human error'. CRC 
Press. 
 
Principally, the system approach recognizes that while the human’s environment can be 
modified to build safeguards against catastrophic events, human error will still continue to occur 





that the human condition of fallibility cannot be changed, the system approach makes a genuine 
effort to connect the human errors to systemic problems within the organization as shown in 
Table 2 (Dekker, 2017; Von Thaden, Wiegmann & Shappell,  2006)   
Supporters of the system approach often promote just cultures, which refers to a model of 
shared accountability around the complex systems that humans operate in, within a safety-critical 
organization (Dekker, 2017).  Essentially this means, humans are responded to equitably, fairly 
and justly and the safety-critical organization consistently and reliably views the incident or 
accident as a learning opportunity and advocates determining more about how the organization 
operates, in order to have created the error in the first place (Dahlin, Chuang & Roulet, 2018; 
Dekker, 2016; Ludwig, 2018).  
While both the person and system approaches share parallel and respectable intentions to 
protect humans in the workplace, neither method has proven to be very successful, as human 
error remains the major cause of all workplace incidents (Dekker, 2014; Reason, 2017; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2017). Insufficient training and development within safety-critical 
organizations alongside human shortcomings of fatigue and complacency continues to trigger 
injury, illness or even death.  So, with safety-critical organizations concerned with workplace 
productivity, financial costs and loss of time for both the organization and the human, some 
industries have started to show significant interest in new technological innovations to combat 
human error incidents (Gill & Shergill, 2004; Janic, 2000; He, Baxter, Xu, J., Zhou & Zhang, 
2019; Taylor, Kazanzides, Fischer & Simaan, 2020)  
Humans and Machines   
Over seventy years ago, the study of AI began originally as an inquiry into the capacity 





reflection of the collective view of technology during that period is demonstrated in eleven 
statements delivered by Paul Fitts, a well-known human performance psychologist as presented 
in Table 2.  Essentially, the aim of Fitts’s 84-page report was to search for a universal response 
to the difficulty of apportioning responsibilities between humans and machines (Fitts, 1951).  
While the long-term memory capacities of machines now clearly exceed human capabilities, the 
purpose of Fitts’s list was to make a general declaration about the future division of labor 
between humans and technology with what was known at the time (De Winter & Dodou, 2014).    
Table 2. The Original Fitts List 
 
Humans appear to surpass present day 
machines in respect to the following: 
 
Present-day machines appear to surpass 
humans in respect to the following:  
1. Ability to detect a small amount of visual 
or acoustic energy 
 
1. Ability to respond quickly to control 
signals and to apply great force smoothly  
 
2. Ability to perceive pattern of light or 
sound 
 
2. Ability to perform repetitive, routine 
tasks 
 
3. Ability to improvise and use flexible 
procedures  
 
3. Ability to store information briefly and 
then to erase it completely 
 
4. Ability to store very large amounts of 
information for long periods and to recall 
relevant facts at the appropriate time  
 




5. Ability to reason inductively  5. Ability to handle highly complex operations, i.e. to do many different things 
at once 
6. Ability to exercise judgment   
Note. Adapted from “Human Engineering for an effective air-navigation and traffic-
control system,” by Fitts, P.M., 1951.  
 
How humans make a living, do business, relate to their labour systems and generally live 
their lives, has dramatically evolved with advancements in technology over four industrial 





from the digital revolution, they are currently experiencing a convergence of digital, biological 
and physical innovations in the Cyber revolution.  There are a number of corresponding 
definitions used to describe this new period of industrial development such as; Industry 4.0, the 
second machine age, smart factory, Industry X.0, and digital workplace (Savić, 2018).   
 
Figure 6. Four Industrial Revolutions, adapted from The Fourth Industrial Revolution, by K. 
Schwab, 2016, Cologny/Geneva: World Economic Forum. 
 
The three stages of AI as shown in Figure 7, illustrate Artificial Narrow Intelligence 
(ANI) as weak, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) at the same capability of a human and 
finally the Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) as self-aware (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019).  Today 
humans have daily access to face and voice recognition, google assistants, music and media 
streaming, uber, vacuum robots and social media feeds which are ubiquitous and all considered 
the weak ANI. In the future, the second initiation of AGI, will be able to autonomously solve 
problems as a human would and the third generation of ASI has the potential to make all human 
tasks obsolete under indisputably conscious systems (Chia, Lim & Chia, 2019; Brynjolfsson & 
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AI is described now as a system’s ability to interpret external information accurately, 
then use that data to achieve specific goals and tasks through ongoing adjustments (Kaplan & 
Haenlein, 2019).  The focus nowadays is on systems like Robotic Process Automation (RPA) to 
perform particular intelligent tasks normally undertaken by humans such as visual perception, 
speech recognition, decision-making, and translation of languages (Chui, 2017; Hussain & 
Zeadally, 2018; Moffitt, Rozario & Vasarhelyi, 2018; Simon, 1995).  There is also evidence of 
increased productivity with humans using wearable technologies that notify them when they 
become tired and robotics that help humans perform life threatening tasks safely (Vishneva, 
2018).  These disruptive technologies and principles of adaptability have been extended to 
business processes that have been transformed across all industries, organizations, and functions 
globally (Chui, 2017; Chui, Manyika & Miremadi, 2016; Daugherty & Wilson, 2018; Manyika, 
et al, 2013).  
 
Figure 7. Stages of Artificial Intelligence, adapted from “Siri, Siri, in my hand: Who’s the fairest 
in the land? On the interpretations, illustrations, and implications of artificial intelligence,” by A. 
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According to the World Economic Forum Report (2016) the main technological drivers 
of change, show that many organizations are beginning to immerse themselves in AI, machine 
learning, robotics, nanotechnology, 3D printing, genetics and biotechnology. These were all once 
previously fragmented fields but are now expanding and amplifying one another (Xie, Zhang & 
Cai, 2019; Zhou, et al, 2019). Yet, organizations in general have not mirrored the same 
expenditure or rate as the technology giants.  In a 2016 survey of 3000 AI conscious leaders of 
industry, technology was only fully adopted in 20 percent of cases as shown in Figure 6 (Chui, 
2017).  
 
Figure 8. How Organizations are adopting AI 2016, adapted from “Artificial intelligence the 
next digital frontier?” by M. Chui, M, 2017, McKinsey and Company Global Institute, 47. 
 
Ultimately, there are sound reasons why those responsible for technology decisions are 
tentative about adopting new technologies.  They are uncertain about return on investment, 


































obtain reliable applications or even how to integrate them into their teams of humans (Chui, 
2017). It is possible too that the reluctance to adopt these emerging technologies by safety-
critical organizations, is due to the innovations developing at such a rapid pace.  Also, it is 
difficult to forecast how humans will respond to a specific technology that has not fully emerged 
and/or not been effusively accepted into the wider community of most safety-critical industries.   
Additionally, it has become increasingly difficult for organizations to close the skills gap 
and identify what jobs are needed in what some label the missing middle, to make those 
disruptive changes in their businesses (Daugherty & Wilson, 2018). By one estimate, 65% 
of primary school children today will eventually end up working in jobs that don't yet exist 
(World Economic Forum, 2016). Furthermore, even though expectations within organizations is 
higher than ever before that many of the repetitive, routine tasks that humans do can be fully 
automated, currently only 5% of jobs can be entirely automated (Technology, Jobs and the 
Future of Work, 2017).  
Three Waves of Safety Training  
While there have been variety of approaches and different technological progressions that 
have advanced safety, recent research has shown that human error has not significantly reduced 
(Dekker, 2017; Reason, 2016).   After the nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 
and Chernobyl in 1986 operational safety began to lead the agenda and attention shifted to 
addressing human errors in safety-critical organizations (Dekker, 2017, Edkins, 2002; Reason; 
1997). The human factors training field emerged as an area of scientific knowledge that drew 
upon various disciplines such as ergonomics, physiology, psychology and engineering (Kelly & 





The first wave of safety training was to encourage the human to use personal protective 
equipment consistently and reliably, while the second wave was to introduce the concept of a 
safety culture.  Nowadays a third wave of safety training involves computer aided smart 
technologies such as; virtual reality, augmented reality, wearable technologies, controlled lab 
tests, simulator-based training and video games to train humans who perform critical tasks and 
further raise safety awareness (Ceruti, Marzocca, Liverani & Bil, 2019; Chia, Lim, Sng, Hwang 
& Chia, 2019; De Crescenzio, et al, 2010; Kurd, Kelly & Austin, 2007; Niu, et al., 2019; Pereira, 
Moore, Gheisari & Esmaeili, 2019; Shmelova, Sikirda, Rizun, Lazorenko & Kharchenko, 2019).  
However, technology experts agree that these need to be further trialed, substantiated and 
fully adopted across more safety-critical organizations (Bolton, et al., 2019; Dameff, Selzer, 
Fisher, Killeen & Tully, 2019; Gao, Gonzalez & Yiu, 2019; Kyriakidis, et al, 2019; Miller, 
Amin, Tu, Echenique & Winokur, 2019). Predominantly, in the aviation industry the number of 
accidents related to mechanical and technical failure have reduced considerably since the 1960’s 
but human errors have declined at a considerably slower rate (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2017).   It 
has become obvious that merely overcoming technical obstacles with technology is not effectual 
enough to mitigate human error.  
Also, it is predicted that a further wave of technology is going to eventuate sooner than 
anticipated and will occur in the form of a fifth Industrial Revolution and these rapid 
transformations will be a part of another social, political, cultural and economic upheaval 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2017; Daugherty & Wilson, 2018; Grace, Salvatier, Dafoe, Zhang & 





Future Workplaces for Humans 
As automation begins to replace humans across the entire global economy, the question 
arises of whether those displaced workers find safe and rewarding jobs or will the revolution 
yield even greater inequality (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2015; Hauer, 2018; Vochozka, Kliestik, 
Kliestikova & Sion, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2016). Essentially this means the Cyber-
systems Revolution is more about humanity as a whole developing its own vision for the 
diffusion of the technologies which will empower fair and equitable social and economic 
development on a global scale. Researchers are beginning to comprehend the enormity of the 
phenomenon and the impact that this high-tech disruption might have on society as a whole 
(Daugherty & Wilson, 2018; Grosz & Stone, 2018; Helbing, et al., 2019; Jacobs, 2019; Keating 
& Nourbakhsh, 2018; Polson & Scott, 2018; Manyika, et al., 2013; Risse, 2019; Yu & Kohane, 
2019).    
Nevertheless, the outcome for the human relies largely on the industry, region and 
occupation they currently survive in and on the response of the various organizational 
stakeholders who are in control of successfully managing the human’s knowledge-work tasks 
(Jacobs, 2017). If humans are at risk of being less useful in the process of goods and services 
with the introduction of new technologies, there will inevitably be a political and governmental 
response to this social challenge of supporting an automated economy.  Some researchers are 
offering the solution in the form of assuring humans are provided a universal basic income (UBI) 
but of course this would require a fundamental shift in how global economies are constructed 
(Santens, 2017; Sheahen, 2012; Susskind & Susskind, 2015).  
Ultimately, the successful integration of human intelligence and emerging technologies 





confident about the technological innovations and changes in their workplace (Auon, 2017; 
Bruun & Dukka, 2018; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2017). It is critical that marginalized social 
groups are not replaced in this process merely because they are unable to communicate about 
how these technological changes are affecting them (Dietvorst, Simmons & Massey, 2015; 
Friedman, 2017). 
Other researchers, specifically in the medical field, warn that introducing a robust 
technological system that is unsupervised by humans might cause even more medical errors 
(Miller & Brown, 2018; Stelfox, Palmisani, Scurlock, Orav & Bates, 2006; Yu & Kohane, 2019).  
In fact, over fifty years ago researchers McCarthy and Hayes (1969) coined the phrase The 
Frame Problem and urged humans who have expert knowledge of specific tasks to closely 
monitor innovative technologies and to remain vigilant over workflows.  Physicist, Stephen 
Hawking warned that some emerging technologies could end mankind and well-known 
entrepreneur Elon Musk openly cautions that AI is a genuine threat to human existence (Cellan-
Jones, 2014).   
Undoubtedly, effective future technologies have the vast potential to completely 
transform how humans safely travel, work, communicate and essentially live their lives, but this 
comes with some level of threat to basic human rights and freedoms (Autor, 2015; Russell, 
Dewey & Tegmark, 2015).   It is difficult to argue against the ordinary idea that underpins how 
emerging technologies should be developed for the common good and benefit of all humanity, 
nonetheless how it is regulated and controlled is a complex void in the research. While global 
multi-corporations and specific nations might advocate a safe code of conduct with reference to 





absence of an international code of ethics for specific new technologies like AI (Boddington, 
2017, Greene, Hoffmann & Stark, 2019; Helbing et al., 2019).   
Influence of HRD Practitioners in Safety-Critical Organizations 
HRD is clearly defined by Jacobs (2019) as “…the process of improving workplace 
performance and facilitating the learning that supports the performance through the 
accomplishments that result from employee development, organization development, career 
development and performance support” (p.28).   However, while an HRD practitioner’s aim is to 
pursue fair outcomes for workers, many programs also have the potential to manipulate and 
exploit workers and can be viewed from an HRD perspective as being “…intricately connected 
to the fate of any organization” (Swanson & Holton, 2009, p.10).   
If there is an oppressed dominant context of practice or an unfair response by a safety-
critical organization, then the HRD practitioner has a definite role in that discourse and action. 
HRD practitioners need to react promptly to these pressures that humans experience in safety-
critical organizations and should be available to address the marked changes in diverse group 
dynamics in their workforces. A decade ago researchers pointed out that even though there was 
a notable increase in cultural diversity there were two other demographics that also required 
close attention; older workers and females who were internationally underrepresented in the 
workplace (Avery & McKay, 2010).  In fact, today some HRD practitioners have been criticized 
as being slow to respond to the changes of in the make-up of these groups of humans in their 
organizations and their reactions to the diversity of specific individuals have even been described 
as “monolithic” (Hughes, 2019, p.81). 
Yet, generally speaking, most HRD practitioners know that it is necessary to recruit groups 





contributions to their safety-critical businesses. So, affirmative action programs and equal 
opportunity employment policies have been implemented to integrate those individual humans 
with different backgrounds and to make them feel accepted, resolve conflicts and find solutions 
to critical tasks more efficiently (Choi & Rainey, 2014; Hughes, 2018). It is the responsibility 
and challenge of the HRD practitioners to match the diverse skills and knowledge along with 
the creative ideas of the human, and align them with the organization’s goals. This is where the 
safety-critical organization, particularly will see their formal diversity policies and programs 
come to a genuine completion. 
A decentralized, diversified workforce has led to new challenges for HRD practitioners 
especially with respects to their roles and responsibilities in training and development (Budhwani 
& McLean, 2019; Jacobs, 2019; Ruona, Lynham & Chermack, 2003; Short, 2013).  For the first 
time three generations of humans are interrelating in the workplace who possess a diverse range 
of skills, values and knowledge and hold very different learning styles and expectations (Byers, 
2012).   Each generation interacts very differently with technology in the workplace 
Some HRD departments are unifying their teams of diverse humans through webinars and 
easy online tools that are looking genuinely at learner preferences and habits and this in turn 
fosters trust on a global scale. As an example, a recent exploratory study examined the 
characteristics of Generation Z, which is currently entering the workforce, and found that HRD 
practitioners needed to examine their approaches and redesign their strategies in order to attract 
and retain this particular cohort (Bharat & Rajendra, 2018).   They found that the Z cohort group 
are more prone to multitasking and prefers to learn autonomously, believing that this approach 
allows them to do more in less time.  This is a good illustration of how these results from this 





needs maximizing in the workplace.  So, it is the HRD practitioner at the front line responding to 
these undercurrents of change in the human who is trying to adjust to their own changes in the 
workplace. How the HRD practitioner responds will make a difference to performance outcomes 
and ultimately transform a safety-critical organization.   
More recently, access to sophisticated technologies has begun to enable even small start-up 
organizations to train their HRD practitioners to become more strategic and participate remotely 
but in real-time in global business events (McWhorter & Lynham, 2014).   The notion that HRD 
practitioners become more involved in utilizing a range of innovative technologies becomes 
appealing to leaders especially in safety-critical organizations, when they realize that most tools 
are relatively easy to access, cost-effective and efficient. The real challenge for HRD 
practitioners is the ongoing preservation and maintenance of those technologies within 
organizations (Li, 2016; Thomas, 2014).  
Nowadays the HRD practitioner needs to become both a development expert and a 
performance consultant who ensures they are well-versed in understanding the demands of the 
organization, the skills of the individual and the technological tools that encourages humans to 
perform better in a global fast-changing environment.  Furthermore, with these constant 
variations in how work is changing and is designed around people who are remote, there exists a 
real need for HRD practitioners themselves to learn up to date technologies and interactive tools 
to be able to improve and evaluate performance.  Research shows that the integration of 
innovative technologies such as; e-guides and resources on commencing, programming, 
supervising and evaluating projects into HRD within organizations can not only augment but 





Of course, the latest smartphone apps, new gaming fads or some up to date wearable 
technologies might begin to appear now and start to be embedded in many organizations but as 
Li (2016) states “…we need to study how it may have changed or altered organizational routines 
and individual behaviors” (p.191).   This means that although the high-tech landscape has 
changed quite significantly with web-based technology and mobile devices, the HRD field needs 
to devote more time to re-consider the practices and processes in this new technological working 
context (Li, 2013). 
However, the HRD scholarly researcher also holds innovative information on new 
approaches to developing and growing people within organizations. How HRD practitioners 
respond to the ethical dilemmas that are presented to them relies very much on how often and 
how well they network with these HRD scholarly researchers.  Participating actively in their own 
HRD professional online communities of practice (COPs) within their reach is all a significant 
part of achieving those successful outcomes.  HRD practitioners must be pro-active in planning 
future dialogues in COPs that bring together the entire supply chain of humans at the sharp end 
in safety-critical workplaces, corporate leaders, HRD scholars and practitioners into 
collaborative meetings because it, “…sets out to get the “entire system” in the room” (Dilworth, 
2003, p.242). HRD practitioners who are at the coalface and academics can collectively create 
new knowledge by investing time in COPs through online discussion boards and chat events in 
virtual communities which ultimately promotes learning and performance in organizations (Bin, 
2015; Chang, Chang & Jacobs, 2009; Evans, 2019; McGuire, O’Donnell, Garavan, Saha & 
Murphy, 2002; Stewart, 2007).   
However, there appears to be an unconvincing connection between the needs of HRD 





practitioners who are searching for practical solutions to daily issues that they experience in 
safety critical workplaces (Kuchinke, 2004).  Additionally, the HRD academics and the 
practitioners are still viewed as distinctly different communities of practice and Kuchinke (2004) 
elucidates that “…practitioners do not find the answers to their problems in the journals and 
conference presentations, and this creates doubts about the relevance of theories for practice and 
distances practitioners from the academic community…” (p.535).  In order to create that level of 
genuine and positive interaction between research and practice it is necessary for academic 
institutions to work in partnership with the HRD professional associations to generate current 
and relevant resources and knowledge (Dewey & Carter, 2003).   
Further, most humans view any loss at work as a danger to them as an individual and 
with this feeling comes enormous pressure.  When a technological revolution is looming in the 
workplace, whether it is minor or major, most humans intuitively weigh up whether the unit of 
loss appears bigger than an equivalent unit of gain (Beenen, 2016).  This is quite an 
understandable response, as loss of things like; loss of face, identity, belonging to a group, a 
specific role, a financial bonus or even saying goodbye to a work colleague are all areas that can 
spark legitimate levels of stress.   Even though a worrying response is common to technological 
changes in an organization it should be viewed by HRD practitioners as normal reaction instead 
of being seen as an undesirable quality.  Normalizing the emotional responses of workers to new 
technologies and being sensitive to those feelings is the first step in the discussion on how to 
manage the adjustments as it somehow prevents panic and the action of fight or flight.  
This literature review endeavoured to highlight the studies of human error in safety-
critical industries that exists and identify the challenges faced, and the paucity of information in 





CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS 
Introduction  
The purpose of this qualitative research was to study the different types of human errors 
that were occurring and the types of technologies that were being adopted to support humans 
while they performed critical tasks in a safety-critical workplace. The most defining 
characteristic of a well-designed qualitative research method is that it centers on “…naturally 
occurring, ordinary events in natural settings…” (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2019, p. 7). My 
conceptual framework reflects my intention to reveal the genuine experience of the human 
performing critical tasks, inserted at the core of an air charter safety-critical organization. 
Whether it is the aviation engineer operating in the Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) 
department or the flight instructor training a student in the air, the human intelligence is 
magnified and positioned at the epicenter in relation to the policies, procedures, tools, tasks and 
technology that supports the daily actions of the human.  
Research questions 
The main overarching question that guided my inquiry was: To what extent do 
technologies help or hinder humans who make human errors in safety-critical workplaces?  
The following sub-research questions were used as a springboard in the collection of all 
the data during the study of the incident reports, observations and interviews at Fly-Past. The 
inquiry focused on the actions of the humans that were performing critical tasks, the types of 
technologies they used or would have liked to use and how they made decisions while under 
pressure performing high consequence tasks.  
The three sub-questions were: 





2. How does technology address those different types of errors? 
3. How does the safety-critical organization address those different types of errors? 
In this chapter, I will expand on the research design, research questions, research site, 
selection of participants and data collections strategies.   
Research design  
For the research design of this study, I followed a basic or generic qualitative study which 
was based on examining the social phenomenon of human error.  This study described how 
humans connect to their social world and are adapting to technology in a safety-critical 
workplace (Merriam, 1998).  As the sole researcher, who remained the primary instrument for 
data collection and analysis, I was interested in understanding the meanings humans have 
constructed in operating daily in an actual safety-critical setting. I employed an inductive 
research strategy with the goal of producing a qualitative study that is thoroughly descriptive to 
deliver a genuine perspective of the humans involved by identifying recurrent patterns in the 
form of themes and categories of human error. 
Research Site  
I undertook a comprehensive search for an appropriate research site across a range of 
safety-critical workplaces in the state of Queensland, including initial conversations with 
managers of large commercial airlines, emergency rooms in public and private hospitals and 
emergency first responders such as fire and police services.   Whilst all the managers at these 
businesses were open to discussions on human error the protocols to interact with the humans in 
their workforce and especially the general community that accessed these services, proved 
challenging mainly with long wait times for approvals between the submission stages.  There 





and government departments to approve interlopers to investigate the topic of human error in 
their establishments.   
Ultimately, a safety-critical air charter and training company located on the East Coast of 
Australia met the criteria and was selected as my research site. This organization that became the 
focus of this field research delivers private air charter, flight training, aircraft maintenance and 
aircraft maintenance training. It will be referred to as Fly-Past (pseudonym) in this paper.  This 
research site was selected among other options, primarily because, following Miles, Huberman 
and Saldaña’s (2019) recommendations, it offered rich sources of collecting data about human 
error in well-appointed, suitable aviation facilities.  Fly-past is certified under CASA (Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority) to provide four major services to the community; aircraft 
maintenance engineering, training for Aircraft Maintenance Engineer Licenses (AMEL), 
personal and business air charter operations in single engine piston powered land airplanes not 
exceeding 5,700 kg maximum take-off weight and a pilot flying school.  
The Director of the site agreed to be part of my study, and the site’s proximity to my 
residence gave me the opportunity to gather “live” genuine data where the daily issue of human 
error in real time, over normal shift patterns were observed (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). This 
airport was once the principal airport in Queensland in the 1930’s but now acts as a secondary 
landing field. It is currently a major GA epicenter for corporate aircraft, private charter, flying 
training and all kinds of maintenance training, supplies and requirements.   
This small-medium enterprise (SME) operates with approximately 35 employees such as; 
directors, aircraft maintenance engineers, pilots, flight and engineering instructors and 
administrative staff.  However, for the purpose of my research I focused on the two dynamic and 





repair and on the job training, and (b) an air charter and pilot flying school. These two distinct 
sections of the business did not share the same geographical position at the the airport as they 
were operating out of different locations approximately a mile apart on the airfield.  The 
company is currently making plans to physically re-structure the whole enterprise so that both 
the aviation maintenance department and the air charter and pilot school share the same roof.  
Aviation Maintenance and On-the-Job Training.   
The maintenance department has been repairing and maintaining aircraft for over twenty 
years in Australia.  Their services are divided into four principal areas; airframe support, 
avionics, spare parts and inspection services.  
Airframe support is their primary service with engineers tasked to manage mostly bird-
strikes, gear-ups, hail damage, and hangar rash. Gear-up maintenance is necessary when an 
aircraft has a belly landing without its landing gear fully extended and uses its underside, or 
belly, as its main landing method.  Hangar rash refers to damage to aircraft that typically 
originates from improper ground handling from another person or interference from another 
aircraft or foreign object damage. Typically, once repaired or re-skinned aircraft are usually 
considered as good as new. Additionally, owners and operators of aircraft also seek out the 
company and the engineers’ knowledge of aircraft who offer a range of inspection services such 
as log book reviews, basic inspections or full surveys.  
However, the current engineers employed by Fly-past are not avionics certified so they 
partner with and refer all avionic upgrades to those third-party avionics’ maintenance businesses 
on the airfield. Any issues related to electronics and associated with navigation and 





those preferred avionics technicians. Similarly, with respect to spare parts, the maintenance 
department sources aircraft parts from their domestic and international network of suppliers.   
Private Air Charter and Pilot Instructor Training.   
The private air charter and training department of Fly-past offers four different services; 
air charter, aircraft private hire, flight training and scenic flights.  The two most engaged services 
are private air charter and flight training. The organization has regular clients who private charter 
operations out of this airport to various regions of Queensland and New South Wales. The 
organization relies on a wide range of approximately fifteen aircraft in their fleet namely; King 
Air B200, Beechcraft Baron 58, Piper Seneca, Cirrus SR22, Cirrus SR20, Cessna 182, Cessna 
172 and Cessna 162.  
Additionally, opening with trial instruction flights Fly-past goes onto feed the complete 
suite of training to student pilots, from the Recreational Pilot to Private Pilot and Commercial 
Pilot training and licensing. Students can also seek out and receive a range of operating 
approvals including Instrument Ratings, Class Ratings, Design Feature Endorsements and other 
specialized activities like Aerobatic elements. 
Seasonal Impact on the Research Site. 
During my data collection in the months of January and February, 2020, Australia 
experienced a prolonged summer heatwave which affected most of the country including south-
east Queensland. The high temperatures occurred especially throughout the month of January, 
2020, breaking records for the duration and individual daily extremes. For the aviation 
maintenance department, the maximum temperatures reached 40 C/ 104 F in the hangar. With 
relative humidity reaching 90% and air conditioning systems failing to support, the organization 





The impact from the hundreds of widespread catastrophic bushfires burning in 
Queensland and neighboring New South Wales, amid high temperatures, volatile winds and dry 
lightning meant there were emergency warnings regularly broadcast to the private charter 
business not to fly in such hazardous circumstances. These dangerous weather conditions 
generated a need to adapt to change in the organization and overcome uncertainties within the 
daily business operations especially with respect to the everyday logistics of booking flying 
lessons for students and scheduling the regular private air charter services.   
While the entire country was said to be at risk through January and February, the threat 
was less immediate at certain times at the research site.  However, the bureau of meteorology and 
fire service officials warned that fires could start anywhere and spread rapidly so the company 
remained vigilant and on high alert about evolving weather conditions. While the extreme heat 
and humidity lingered into the latter part of my data collection it also brought severe storms and 
flooding for Queensland in the month of February, 2020. The scale and longevity of the 
unprecedented bushfires, persistent punishing heat and then flash flooding provided a dramatic 
and dynamic backdrop in the collection of the data at the safety-critical site.  
Research Participants   
My qualitative research methodology focused on in-depth narrations of the phenomenon 
of human error from those humans who were immersed in an aviation maintenance and air 
charter context. For the purpose of this study, I used purposeful sampling, with participants that 
would fulfil the following inclusion criteria as shown in Table 3: (a) over 18 years old; (b) were 
fluent in the English language, both spoken and written (c) had more than five years work 





(e) any gender; and (f) who had worked in the Aviation industry, for at least five continual years 
full-time.   
My research questions helped set the boundaries for deciding on the sample size.  I found 
seven (7) eligible contenders actually fulfilled the inclusion criteria. However, following 
qualitative experts’ recommendations (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Stake, 2010; Yin, 2003), I 
estimated that 3-4 participants would provide me with rich information, without saturation.  
Saturation, or sometimes referred to as information power, alerts the qualitative researcher that 
the more data a sample holds, the lower number of participants is required (Malterud, Siersma & 
Guassora, 2016; Yin, 2003). So, I pointed my attention towards using four participants initially 
in my data collection choosing who I observed and interviewed (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 
2019) based on the above-mentioned criteria. During the data collection process, I considered 
this number to be satisfactory to meet the objectives of this study (Saunders, et al., 2017). 
All the potential participants volunteered their time and were free to withdraw from the 
study at any time. There were seven potential research participants invited to participate. I 
contacted the seven eligible participants through their director via email (Appendix A) and 
organized an initial procedure meeting (Appendix B).  At those individual meetings I handed 
each of them an information sheet outlining the parameters of the study and timeframe.  The 
potential participants reviewed and signed the consent form for my records (Appendix C). As I 
only required four participants for my research, they understood they might not be selected for 
the study but we established a suitable pseudonym to mask their identity should they be chosen.  
Although, seven were eligible, I selected four research participants whose schedules and 
availability would make it possible to collect the data within my research schedule. I informed 





timeline of my data collection, there still could be a chance I might reach out to them again to 
contribute. All the research participants in the study were also appointed pseudonyms in the 
selection process.  
While this research concentrated exclusively on two aircraft maintenance engineers and 
two pilot instructors (See Table 3), this small-medium enterprise (SME) operates with 
approximately thirty-five employees that comprise generally of; directors, a safety and 
compliance officer, aircraft maintenance engineers, apprentice engineers, pilots and 
administrative staff.  Other people interrelating and interdepending with the engineers are the 
regular customers who routinely own and operate their aircraft companies principally out of this 
airport. The pilots are mainly communicating with the student pilots in their training rooms and 
engaging with the customers that are utilizing their private air charter services.  
The engineers and pilots are operational from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on a normal day 
shift.  While the engineers work in the maintenance repair department through a standard 
working week from Monday to Friday, the pilot flying school operates seven days a week. All of 
the participants had substantial experience and knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. 
From the outset it should be acknowledged that at all time the four research participants 
(engineers and pilots) referred to incidents and scenarios associated with human error 
involvements at other safety-critical organizations over their career and did not relay any specific 









Table 3. Summary of Research Participants  
 
Note: LAME denotes Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers  
Title Pseudonym  Gender/Age  
Years of 
full-time 
experience   
Years of 
experience 
in Fly-Past  




Baron  Male  
68 
years  















signing off on staged 
duplicate inspections of 





Jet  Male 
39 
years  




















signing off on staged 





Charlie  Male 
42 
years   









responsible for all 
student pilots and the 
whole instructor team of 
pilots 
supervision of the safe 
delivery and scheduling 
of all air charter 
operations 
approving license 
issuances to new pilots  
ensures all parties have 
the correct equipment 



















responsible for student 





LAMEs: Licensed Aviation Maintenance Engineers. 
In order to be qualified as a Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (LAME) in 
Australia, an engineer needs to be at least 21 years of age and have had at least 4 years’ 
experience in on-the-job training.  Most apprentices seek on-the-job training through a major 
commercial airline, the defense force or in GA. The qualification requirement also stipulates that 
the engineer should have had at least 2 years’ experience in the category of the license they hold 
which can either as Airframe (AF), Engine (Eng) or Electrical, Instrument and Radio (EI&R). 
Baron (pseudonym) is a 68-year-old Australian male, a LAME with nearly 50 years of 
extensive experience as a licensed (B1) Airframe and Engines engineer.  Baron has worked in 
everything from large commercial airlines to building, owning and operating his own aircraft air 
charter company in Western Australia. One of the proudest aspects of his career is his 
maintenance engineering experience working with the Royal Flying Doctors Service across 
Australia. Baron has worked for over two years as a contracted lead engineer at Fly-Past and is 
also responsible for the supervision of two apprentices who hold contracts with the 
organization. Baron also holds a commercial pilots license.    
Jet (pseudonym) is a 39-year-old Australian male, a LAME with fourteen years of 
experience as a licensed (B1) Airframe and Engines engineer.  Jet has been employed full time 
with Fly-Past as their chief engineer for the past eight years. Jet is also responsible for the 
training of two apprentices under his care; one first year female and one third year male 
apprentice. Both Baron and Jet are responsible for signing on all duplicate inspections on 





Pilot Instructors.  
Charlie (pseudonym) is a 42-year-old Australian Male who is a flight instructor and 
examiner at Fly-past. He has been working as a commercial pilot for over twenty-five years and 
retained by Fly-past as the chief pilot for the last eight years as their sole flight examiner. As a 
Chief Pilot for this safety-critical organization, Charlie is responsible for the safe delivery of 
both training and charter operations, and is a designated testing officer responsible for approving 
license issuances to new pilots. With his 25 years of flying experience, which does not include 
his experience flying gliders as a teenager, he is the most experienced staff member in the flying 
school.  Amelia (pseudonym) is a 30-year-old Australian female, Second Grade Flight 
instructor/pilot with a CPL (commercial pilot license) and has been certified for two years.  
While she has been retained by Fly-past for only the last 18 months she has had seven years full 
time flying experience as a private pilot and has been flying since she was 15 years old. Her 
professional background is as a business analyst with experience in writing operation manuals 
for small type aircraft. Amelia also holds a degree in IT systems and an MBA. Amelia is also a 
Cirrus approved Pilot Instructor. 
Data Collection Strategies  
My data collection strategies included the use of a field log, a private field journal, 
observation grids, and initial summaries of the data.  I used the field log to outline the timing of 
the collection of the review of incident reports, observations and interviews that were 
prearranged to take place in that order.  The private field journal recorded my thoughts, feelings, 
impressions and questions throughout the course of data collection (Appendix F). The 
observation grids provided a framework that ensured I stayed on track with respect to my 





G). Initial summaries recorded all the major themes and patterns I collected from the three 
sources of data; incident reports, observations and interviews.  
Incident Reports.  
To start my data collection process, I gained full and complete access to all incident 
reports from 2019, captured in the secure online safety management system at Fly-Past. The goal 
of using the incident reports was to capture useful information and material to ask further 
relevant questions in the subsequent observations and interviews. The incident reports provided a 
good foundation for the data that was collected in the observations and interviews.  Even though 
these incident reports were fragmented and trivial in quantity (33), the scope of their content 
allowed me to verify specific information that participants referred to in the observations and 
discussed in the interviews. Furthermore, these reports assisted me to better understand the 
specific jargon of this GA setting as well as appreciate the general nature of how safety was 
managed in this particular safety-critical organization (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). A sample of 
an incident report from the organization’s database is shown in Appendix H.   
Observations. 
The next data collection strategy involved observations of the participants in their safety-
critical workplace. These observations were comprised of two separate yet interconnected 
activities, (a) my immersion in a familiar aviation community, and (b) the writing of the field 
notes of that world (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2011).  I observed four participants in the months 
of January and February, 2020 in their standard shift patterns of up to four hours at a time, 
depending on their tasks and activity. I did not participate in any of their activities and my role as 
a complete observer was known to everyone on the shift (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). I used the 





on seeing how these humans interact with the general world of work in a GA safety-critical 
organization. While all sectors of aviation are highly regulated and humans are accustomed to 
routine assessors visiting their workplace, I did not want to be perceived as a detective or 
someone in authority who was going to report on or audit their affairs. With this in mind, I 
intentionally arrived early and delayed my departure after each session to informally engage with 
people in the crew room or reception. Additionally, I purposely postponed writing obvious field 
notes in the beginning and simply observed, trying to display an unaffected and genuine interest 
in the everyday activities and/or any significant events that were occurring (Emerson, Fretz & 
Shaw, 2011).   
Before and after each observation session I used my field journal and observation grid 
notes to record the dates and periods of time spent observing participants (Appendix G). At no 
time did I feel the need to make any notes during the actual observations, however the private 
field journal and the observation grid were very important tools to make a reference to, after the 
observation periods. Questions that resulted from the observations were examined and 
incorporated into the follow up interviews with the participants. 
Interviews. 
The third and final phase of the data collection included two separate forty-five-minute, 
face-to-face semi-structured interviews of the eligible and volunteer participants (Appendix D). 
The first round of interviews was prearranged to happen immediately after the observations. My 
decision to conduct interviews that emerged after the observations was based on the 
understanding that words shared are only sample components of data at a particular time and 





conducted in person in a conference room, during a standard day shift. They were digitally 
recorded and took the 45-60 minutes as scheduled.  
The goal of the first round of interviews was to gather information about the experiences 
of humans who work in safety-critical industries like GA.  More specifically, I was interested in 
hearing about the participants involvements with human error and to learn more about the 
interaction of humans with technologies, and what impact that might have on human error. I 
made it clear how I defined human error as either an execution failure such as a slip or a lapse in 
judgement or a planning failure such as not being aware of a rule or a knowledge-based mistake. 
I offered my personal definition as I wanted to ensure that the conversation remained within the 
parameters of the topic of unintentional, unplanned human errors as I was not concerned with 
deliberate acts or violations.  I also made it clear to the participants that they should feel 
unrestricted to discuss human error events either in their current organization or any experience 
that had occurred over their lifetime of working in a safety-critical workplace.   
The second interviews were conducted in person, in the same conference room as the first 
interviews.  They were digitally recorded and took 30-45 minutes as scheduled. The interviews 
took place after each participant had received and reviewed a brief summary of what I had seen 
in the observations and recorded in the first interviews. While I did not provide the transcripts of 
the first interviews in those summaries, I did offer my understanding of the discussions that had 
taken place in the form of an account separated into four or five major themes for each 
participant to review.   Each participant received these brief summaries of about 4 to 5 pages, at 
least one week before the second round of interviews were scheduled.  The goal of this second 
interview was to review the themes in the summary and provide an opportunity for the 





Appendix E.  It also gave me a chance to ask additional questions about events that occurred on 
their shift during my observation phase and follow up on accounts in the first interviews.  
A semi-structured interview guide was used for each interview and modified in real time 
during the interviews as shown in Appendix D and Appendix E. The discussion questions 
emerged from the themes from the incident reports, the observations and the natural flow of the 
dialogues. If the interview questions had been too structured and organized it would have left me 
as the researcher, blind to the site (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2019). So, rather than a linear 
question and answer format strictly following a list of formalized questions, I encouraged more 
of a dialogue with the participants. Instead of answering direct questions participants were 
strongly encouraged to talk at length. 
While the participants were made to feel comfortable about talking, I guided them to stay 
on the topic of human error and talk more about uncommon organizational incidents that might 
have occurred over their professional career.  Akin to the method defined as the Critical Incident 
Technique (CIT) that is designed to collect direct observations of human behavior, I elicited their 
personal accounts of their experiences (Flanagan, 1954).  I asked all-encompassing questions to 
gain an understanding of; the cause of the human error, a detailed description and outcome of the 
critical incidents, what actions were taken, how the participant felt and if they believed that any 
changes might be made in the future to mitigate the error.  
During the first semi-structured interview, my main intention was to focus more on 
specific critical incidents and the types of behavior that occurred when these research 
participants interacted with technology rather than examining how the organization managed the 
incident. My style of questioning was not directed at yielding solutions for systemic problems in 





broad-spectrum enquiry into human error was deliberately supposed to generate more 
information than was asked for and I recognize that a lot of data has been excluded in this final 
report however, the information collected provides important context and details (Stake, 2010).  
After the first round of interviews were completed, I composed a brief summary of my 
initial deliberations of both the observations and interviews. I delivered this brief summary 
separately via a confidential email to each research participant approximately one week after the 
initial official interview.  These briefs were distributed to confirm the truthfulness of what I had 
observed in the workplace and recorded in the interviews. Along with the brief summary I asked 
the participants to not only clarify my account but prepare some questions before their 
scheduled, secondary follow up interview.  
Research participants were given the opportunity to highlight any data they felt was 
misinterpreted in my initial summaries, in the secondary follow up, member checking interview 
which occurred two weeks after the distribution of the brief summary. It also provided the 
participants an opportunity to volunteer supplementary information that they wanted to 
contribute since the first semi-structured interview. The foundation of this member checking 
guide included only a few open-ended questions, largely designed around the reflections of the 
observations and interviews (Appendix E).  
For the purpose of storing and saving the recorded data in textual format, I used the 
services of google voice typing and directly after each interview I made field notes that were 
recorded in my field journal.  No interviews required an interpreter. 
My Role as the Researcher 
 My principal role as a researcher was to take an interpretative stance by closely attending 





process of reading incident reports, observing and interviewing (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).  
This essentially means that I was directly accountable in a sustained and concentrated context to 
gain a deeper understanding of four research participants accurate interpretations of their 
incidents as opposed to a surface description from a larger sample of humans.  How the research 
participants derived meaning from their human error experiences and their safety-critical 
surroundings was significant to understanding their behavior.  Yet, possibly more importantly, 
by ensuring that their stories were told truthfully meant that the sound ethical trajectory of this 
intensive, qualitative research process stayed on track.   
With these ethical concerns in mind, I recognized reflexively my biases, values and 
professional experience might have the potential to add some bias to my field research. In fact, 
there were two possible sources of bias that might have occurred while I was on the research site; 
the effect of my presence on the participants and prejudices stemming from the effects of the site 
on me, in my role as the researcher (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2019).   
To address the first issue, I made sure that my intentions were clear to participants by 
organizing a pre-selection interview with eight staff members to present to them individually 
why I was in their workplace, what subject I was examining, how I was going to collect the 
information and what I was going to do with it.  This discrete time with them also allowed me to 
tell them about my own aviation background. While I have a professional background working 
in a major commercial airline and an understanding of the certain types of time pressured 
operational conditions that aviation engineers and pilots work under, I had no work experience or 
understanding of small GA private air charter businesses.  This time spent before the official 
field research began gave me time to gather more information on how the GA business was 





I also understood that in order to be perceived as non-threatening it was important for me 
to try to fit naturally into the research participants’ setting by maintaining a lower, casual profile 
and ensure they were comfortable with me in their workspace. I intentionally arrived early and 
delayed my departure from the research site after each observation and interview session. I spent 
valuable time in the crew rooms of both the aviation maintenance and air charter departments 
mostly discussing; the extreme weather conditions, flight plans, student achievements, plans for 
the week and workflows that occurred over the weekend.  These spontaneous, off the cuff 
conversations undertaken in their space not only built an important rapport but a kind of trust that 
my research goals were innocuous and I shared their comparable attitude towards safety in 
aviation.   
I also was conscious of managing the effects of the site on me to ensure that the data 
collected remained uncontaminated from the potential hidden political or social agendas that the 
research participants might have maintained.  I intentionally spread the timing of my site visits 
out to give me time to digest and research alone, especially new technical information.  
For example, I spent periods researching Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB) 
reports that the engineers and pilots had referred to in our discussions. While these ATSB reports 
provided the technical evidence that I needed to confirm the conversations with the research 
participants they were dense with sensitive stories related to aircraft accidents and fatalities.  I 
took this valuable time to comprehend the perilous nature of the GA industry through these 
accounts on the ATSB site (ATSB, 2020).  Additionally, while I felt that I was generally 
accepted into the organization to collect data, I also was mindful that I was an outsider, so I was 
continually processing my private thoughts carefully and ultimately translated them into 





by always keeping my research questions firmly in my mind (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 
2019).   
Validity and Reliability  
My data collection took place in an aviation maintenance repair workshop and flight 
training school for pilots which rendered me directly accountable to deliver accurate accounts of 
the humans that work in these safety-critical workplaces (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2019). To 
demonstrate a high level of credibility of my sources and deliver an “…authentic portrait…” of 
my participants, I employed the following validity and reliability measures that show that I took 
reasonable care, and that my process was stable over time (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2019, p. 
306).   
Criteria for Validity. 
Incident reports, observations and interviews established validity through methodological 
triangulation, which Denzin (2012) suggests should even be rewritten as ‘crystal refraction’.  
This method of considering different facets of the data, curbed and controlled any bias. I 
searched for what happened in specific human error incidents and took an interpretive stance to 
understand what it meant to the human directly involved in that situation, from their perspective.   
It was important to check how accurately the participants’ realities were ultimately 
represented in my final account of their socially constructed stories so I openly offered them an 
opportunity to evaluate my interpretations of their experiences (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  This 
transparent process not only produced convincing and plausible accounts for this final 
dissertation submission but aims to help the reader to feel immersed in the participants’ 





Criteria for Reliability. 
This qualitative study took place in an actual workplace context and had the potential to 
have real consequences on people’s lives so it was important that the order of how my data was 
collected, processed, transformed and displayed, is easily followed.  Careful and consistent 
documentation of all phases of the research was vital to not only ensure reliability but also enable 
other researchers to track my procedures (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2019). This meant 
ensuring my questions matched the qualitative design, the data was collected across a breadth of 
settings and times, my role as a researcher was clearly defined and the transcripts were cross-
checked for inaccuracies and drift (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Rival conclusions or opposing 
theories were fully examined and considered. 
Data analysis strategies  
The data analysis involved classifying, people, events, tools and tasks to identify and 
describe patterns and themes of human error in the safety-critical organization (Miles, Huberman 
& Saldaña, 2019).  
The main objective in the analysis phase was to attend to all the collected evidence and 
be guided by analytic techniques such as; matching patterns, building on explanations, time-
series analysis, logic models and cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2003). Both data collection and 
analysis were simultaneously reviewed and continually coded throughout the entire field 
research process (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). This process of concurrent collection and analysis 
helped me to cycle back and forth between examining existing data and creating strategies for 
collecting new and improved data. This style of data analysis permitted the production of regular 






Figure 9. Word Cloud Generated from Engineer transcripts from semi-structured interviews 
 
 





Quotes were selected from the transcripts that revealed the human’s commonly 
articulated feelings of involvement with human error and how they used specific technologies. 
Additionally, the word clouds as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 tracked frequently voiced 
expressions and prompted correlated sub-topics that were associated with or part of the subject of 
human-technology interaction which helped construct a broader network of data to facilitate a 
much wider, more comprehensive analysis.  In the next chapter, I will describe in detail the 






CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 
Introduction  
While I had earlier reviewed the literature on human error predominantly in the medical, 
marine and aviation industries, I was intuitively more drawn to aviation, given my prior work 
involvement in the aviation engineering industry. So, this account will outline the findings from 
my chosen research site, a safety-critical setting of Fly-Past, a GA operation that delivers flight 
training, private air charter and aircraft maintenance from a secondary airfield in Australia.  As 
the researcher I absorbed information from reading incident reports, watching aviation engineers 
and pilots in their daily activities and listening to them speak about their involvements with 
human error.   
My attention focused on the activities of these humans that are experienced in their field 
and accustomed to execute daily critical tasks on or around an aircraft.  In addition to observing 
their tasks, I concurrently absorbed data about the types of tools and technologies they used or 
would like to use and how they were trouble-shooting, formulating assessments and making 
evaluations, under enormous organizational and work pressures, while performing those high 
consequence tasks.   
My overarching research question was backed by sub-questions that steered the way to a 
deeper understanding of my research interest of human error. The principal overarching question 
that guided my inquiry was:  
To what extent do technologies help or hinder humans who make human errors in safety-critical 
workplaces?  
The three sub-questions were: 





2. How does technology address those different types of errors? 
3. How does the safety-critical organization address those different types of errors?  
My research, including the exhaustive literature review on human error in safety critical 
industries, my study of incident report documents at the research site and my observations and 
interviews, led me to gather data on human error that would later support my findings and 
response to my research inquiry. I have organized my findings by the themes created from my 
three research sub questions and the following section shows what I found at the research site in 
response to those questions. 
Types of Human Errors  
In two instances of data collection, specific types of human errors were identified and 
then compared with the discussions in the literature, and corroborated by triangulation. While 
human errors were not detected during any of my observations, the incident reports and 
interviews provided a clear understanding of the types of human errors that were common in Fly-
Past and various safety-critical organizations, around Australia. All incident reports were logged 
at the research site in 2019. More comprehensive explanations from the incident reports can be 
found in Appendix I.  Stories that illustrate the types of human errors experienced by the pilots 
and engineers, drawn from the interviews follow later.   
A count of all the human errors found in both the incident reports and in the interviews, is 
shown in Figure 12 linked to Rasmussen’s SKR Taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1986).  Ultimately, 
none of the human error events discussed in the interviews were connected with the incident 
reports.  All events have been divided into skill, rule or knowledge-based errors along with 
hazards or reports entered in error. Then the following Table 4 shows the events itemized which 





assigned to each event.  This Table 4 does not include any details about the hazards or any events 
entered in error.  
 
Figure 11. Types of Human Errors Identified in this Research linked to Rasmussen’s Taxonomy 
Approximately 5% of these incident reports were entered in error with a double capture 
but they still remained on the safety-critical organization’s safety management system. 
Additionally, 9% were logged as hazards but not defined as critical human errors. Examples of 
hazards were, coffee makers requiring water filter upgrades in the crew room or a request for an 
improved hazard signage in the lunch room.  These could have been more appropriately flagged 
and uploaded on an alternative system notifying that these issues required attention or 
maintenance.  
Nevertheless, the examination of the reports and the transcripts from the interviews 
clearly indicated that the data corresponded with Rasmussen’s SKR research on classifying 
human error, (See Figure 2) from forty years ago (Rasmussen, 1982). Illustrations of how well 






















related to skill-based errors (55%) than there were rule-based errors (14%) and knowledge-based 
errors (17%), as shown in Figure 10 (Salminen & Tallberg, 1996; Rasmussen, 1982).   
Table 4. Types of Human Errors Identified in this Research linked to SKR Taxonomy 
 
Note: These are abbreviated descriptions of the incident reports and interviews, longer 
descriptions of the incident reports can be found in Appendix I.  
 
 
SKILL BASED ERRORS (55%)  
From Pilot Incident reports  From Pilot Interviews  
Near miss of aircraft on runway  
Aircraft pushed into hangar wall 
Student pilot makes tail strike on runway  
Failure to submit an appropriate mayday 
Pilot blames engineer for engine failure  
From Engineer Incident reports From Engineer Interviews 
Live aircraft left unattended  
Fuel spill on engineer 
Fall from height stepping backwards 
Dust and debris in eyes 
Holding live propeller blade  
Tow bar left attached after parking  
Towed aircraft hit hangar door 
Engineer fell from an elevated position 
Gas bottles left in incorrect location 
Aircraft inadequately tied down  
Overexertion moving Hangar doors (x 4) 
Engineer discharged a compressed cylinder 
Engineer overlooks a fatigue crack  
Engineer overlooks a critical component 
Engineers overlooks flight tags  
RULE-BASED ERRORS (14%) 
Engineer Incident Reports (only) No rule-based errors relayed in interviews 
by either engineers or pilots. Engineer incorrectly filled fuel tanks 
Engineer carried out fueling in hangar  
Quantity of fuel exceeded guidelines 
Handover of work packs incorrect 
Underserviced tire 
Tire supplier sent incorrect part 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ERRORS (17%) 
Pilot Incident Reports (only) From Pilot Interviews   
Pilots too close to live active aircraft  
Excessive number of aircraft manoeuvres  
Not acceptable proximity  
Poor verification of location on runway 
Unaware of chain of Communication 
Insufficient weather data before flight 
Insufficient information about airfield  
(INSIGNIFICANT HAZARDS 9%) 






The details described exclusively in the skill-based incident reports shows that both pilots 
and engineers inadequately performed high consequence tasks and failed to demonstrate a skill, 
either due to inattention or due to insufficient tools or resources. The higher number of skill-
based errors, significantly emphasized incidents of human error, primarily related to person-
machine interface or what is commonly known in the industry as humans experiencing slips, 
trips or falls.   
Out of the skill-based errors, approximately 20% were associated with the pilots but the 
majority occurred in or around the maintenance hangar and were related to the human error 
experiences of the engineers. Examples of skill-based errors from the incident reports were 
events like pilots incorrectly manually maneuvering an aircraft into a hangar wall or an engineer 
falling from an elevated position.  More illustrations of the types of behavior drawn from the 
incident reports related to skill-based errors are listed in Appendix I. 
The rule-based errors (14%) appeared significantly less than the skill-based errors (55%) 
which also sits in parallel with Rasmussen’s SKR studies (See Figure 2) (Rasmussen, 1982). Yet, 
there were less rule-based errors (14%) than knowledge-based errors (17%) which contradicts 
Rasmussen’s findings who found more rule-based errors than knowledge-based errors 
(Rasmussen, 1986).  However, it is notable that more rule-based errors than knowledge-based 
errors were found in the incident reports on the site. Additionally, no mention of rule-based 
errors was found in the interviews from either the engineers or the pilots.  
All of the specific rule-based errors (14%) emphasized the humans’ mishandlings of 
effective guidelines fixed by either the Australian government regulating bodies or the safety-





maintenance hangar by the engineers.  No rule-based errors could be found related to the pilots. 
Examples of rule-based errors were; handing over work packs incorrectly and unsafe fueling 
exceeding storage guidelines in the hangar. More examples of the types of behavior drawn from 
the incident reports associated with rule-based errors are listed in Appendix I.  
The knowledge-based errors (17%) were found to be slightly more than the rule-based 
(14%) as shown in figure 10, which does not correspond with Rasmussen’s SKR studies (See 
Figure. 2) (Rasmussen, 1982). Rasmussen found in his studies that humans performed 
knowledge-based errors the least out of all the skills, rules and knowledge-based errors, while 
performing a critical task (Rasmussen, 1986). All the identified knowledge-based errors from my 
field research underscored the humans’ misapplication of their knowledge due to a memory lapse 
or due to insufficient knowledge.   
The deficiencies of knowledge by the human could have been due to either lack of prior 
training and development or lack of knowledge supplied by the safety-critical organization, Fly-
Past. All the knowledge-based errors, were carried out by the pilots. No record of knowledge-
based errors drawn were reportedly carried out by the engineers. Examples of knowledge-based 
errors were incidents like pilots being in close proximity to live active aircraft during training or 
being involved in excessive number of aircraft maneuvers in an ATC area. More examples of the 
types of behavior drawn from the incident reports related to knowledge-based errors are listed in 
Appendix I.  
So, in summary, the results of the data collected closely matched Rasmussen’s research 
on SKR where more skill-based errors were discovered than rule or knowledge-based errors. 





the engineers were involved in all the rule-based errors and the pilots experienced all the 
knowledge-based errors. 
However, I found that neither Rasmussen’s SKR taxonomy nor other literature reviewed, 
completely covered what appears to be a type of human error that emerges when humans try to 
improve safety but their ideas are not communicated clearly within their own industry 
environment. I will provide further details on the latter in Chapter 5.  
The next section offers detailed accounts of human error events interwoven with verbatim 
narrations as described by the pilots and engineers from the interviews.  These accounts aim to 
serve as an illustration of the types of human error summarized in this first section.   
Stories that Illustrate the Types of Human Errors. 
During the two semi-structured interviews, eight major human error incidents dominated 
the discussions and were referred to by the four research participants; two aviation engineers and 
two pilots as shown in Table 4.  All research participants presented incidents related to skill-
based errors except for the chief pilot, Charlie, who offered only incidents related to knowledge-
based errors.  None of the research participants presented any incidents related to rule-based 
errors in the interviews.  
The skill-based error incidents reported, were mainly associated with carelessness and 
inadequate attention to detail on the job, most likely due to distractions or interruptions. Most of 
the tasks carried out while making skill-based errors occurred when capable and well-practiced 
humans undertaking familiar everyday tasks became fatigued or their attention was diverted and 
they experienced a slip.  The knowledge-based errors were due to the humans not possessing 





Baron, the lead engineer first relayed a critical incident associated to skill-based error 
associated with a compressed cylinder in an undercarriage that discharged on his shift. Aviation 
maintenance engineers like Baron are acutely aware of the life-threatening nature of compressed 
gas cylinders (Image shown in Figure 13) and the need to not only accurately maintain but 
identify the stamps on the cylinders that indicate the historical record of the contents.   
“So, I was on shift and saw this happen to a poor guy who was pulling apart a 
compressed cylinder… I don’t know what he was doing because I was across the 
hangar but he did not check to see if it had been drained of any pressure so it went 
straight through his head and his head ended up through the roof…. Maybe he assumed 
that someone else had taken care of it…but I think he was not paying attention. He was 
killed instantly. Not a good day”.  
 
Figure 12. Image taken of Compressed Gas Cylinders in General Aviation 
 
Baron goes onto make a general comment about engineers overlooking fatigue cracks in 
the skin of an aircraft or not closely checking for corrosion or properly inspecting rivets.  Baron 
regularly works on older aircraft like the Cessna 172s that have been flown by inexperienced 
student pilots. These aircraft are flown regularly by student pilots who need to demonstrate 
frequent take off and landings recurring flight cycles for their circuit training. Sometimes the 





to fatigue.  As the skin of the aircraft deteriorates over time, it eventually requires a very detailed 
inspection by the engineer. These limitations on these older aircraft reveal themselves in 
infinitesimal cracks that are barely visible to the human eye yet grow bigger and eventually 
become noticeable. However, they require close attention by the engineer when they are 
microscopic. Baron said; 
“My whole day is closely checking and double checking my work and everyone else’s 
work. I pick up missed cracks, rivets or corrosion all the time…I keep checking and 
double checking for wear and tear and cracks. I run my hands and eyes over every 
section. I found missed corrosion the other day someone missed…They miss rivets that 
are corroded or blown out.  So, the whole aircraft can burst apart in flight if you missed 
a crack. You have to pay attention.” 
Jet the chief engineer, also referred to inattention to detail as the cause of a failed 
duplicate inspection.  A second inspection is usually called for when an aircraft maintenance task 
has been designated sufficiently risky enough to warrant two qualified and fully licensed aircraft 
maintenance engineers to review and then sign off on the job.   
In this particular case Jet had assigned two licensed engineers to perform a duplicate 
inspection on a complex component that was poorly designed and difficult to access and view. 
The first engineer expressed no confidence in the way the second inspection was handled by 
second engineer’s casual approach so requested support from Jet. While Jet was supervising the 
entire job, it was not commonplace to be called upon for a third inspection unless there was an 
indication that the inspection was too brief.  Jet detected the fault in the flight control component 
by taking it apart and using a flashlight to view the multi-layered section of the aircraft.  Jet 
claims that if the fragmented part had remained unnoticed and the engineers had both signed off 
on duplicate inspection as successfully completed work, it definitely would have caused the 
aircraft to crash. He labels the engineer who did not pick up the fault on the second inspection, 





 “Lazy LAME came along and inspected the job for the duplicate… So, one wire was 
held in by a bolt the other by friction only. Like I said it was difficult to see and on top 
of everything a bad design but at the end of the day it was reassembled incorrectly by 
the first engineer. If they had flown with that it would have blown out and caused an 
accident. He only casually looked at the completed job. He had a general lookover not 
with the depth he should of. You gotta see everything that is done with your own eyes.  
Never assume.  He did not detect it. It would have crashed if I had not checked it 
myself.” 
 
Jet went onto talk about skill-based errors related to ground crew failing to notice flags 
and tags on an aircraft which are routinely noticed as a red ribbon that hangs from areas of the 
aircraft with the words “Remove before flight” . This communicates clearly to the engineer that a 
moving mechanical part has a pin in it such as the landing gear, that needs to be removed before 
the aircraft can successfully take off. Alternatively, a red tag can denote that a critical flight 
instrument or device is covered such as a pitot tube. These pitot tubes are covered to stop insects 
or debris entering while the aircraft is parked. If a pitot tube becomes blocked during flight it can 
affect airspeed indicator warnings to the pilot.  Jet cited the inadequate push back of an aircraft in 
Brisbane with flags denoting that the pitot tubes were covered as shown in Figure 13.   Jet talked 
about complacency and the dangers of assuming other people are doing their job in a safety-
critical setting.   Jet said: 
“Sometimes we tag or flag things. There is a reason something has got a flag on it. 
Flags are used before you fly. They pushed back an aircraft with all pitot covers and 
flags all over it. people are everywhere under the wing pushing the thing back with 
flags all over it.  It took off and had to circle over the bay and dump fuel and then come 
back and land. People don’t notice things going on. They are not observing. Maybe 
because it was up high I don’t know.  Other people think that someone else was doing 








Figure 13. Image taken from ATSB report on Airbus A330, 9M-MTK, Brisbane Airport - 
Failure to remove flags (ATSB, 2019) 
 
Amelia the pilot instructor, indicated a mechanical breakdown occurred when a screw 
became loose in a crankcase causing her to have engine failure mid-flight. Amelia pointed to an 
engineer’s skill-based error not successfully concluding a critical task to completion and 
suggested that he probably got distracted. Amelia said: 
“I was flying an airplane that had only just been released from the Maintenance shop. 
Yeah only an hour's time out of maintenance I just departed [location] and a screw 
came out of top of the crankcase and I lost all my oil. It was all over my windscreen. I 
could not see anything. This all happened in a space of about 2 or 3 minutes.  I 
managed to get the plane home. I was very lucky. But the human error was a screw in 
the top of the crankcase had not been torque wrenched correctly because the engineer 
had gotten distracted.  In the investigation a little mark showed that the torque wrench 
had touched it but it had not been completed correctly. Yeah that was quite a significant 
slip” 
 
In the second follow up interview I questioned Amelia again about the incident where she 





her views on any skill-based errors she thought she may have made during the critical incident.  
Amelia responded by talking about the de-brief she endured with her supervisor and other 
members of staff as she watched the Go Pro footage that had recorded her reactions during the 
critical incident. Amelia said: 
“I have watched it over and over on the go pro… It is hard to watch. It is confronting…I 
watched it with my boss. Everyone has an opinion.  I did a sloppy radio call. Yeah, my 
communication with the tower could have been clearer… I knew I had only a few 
minutes. There was just enough left in the engine to idle at the end. I did not want to 
call a Mayday because that would have just confirmed to me out loud that I was going 
to die…I had a student pilot with me who went very quiet too quiet. I took over the 
controls and I think went into denial at first. I thought. Where do I go? Where do I 
land? No time. Just departed [location]. I was 1500 feet on climb. I field hopped. I kept 
thinking there was a rubbish tip at Wooloowin. I thought about a school field and I 
kept thinking about the children and thinking nobody would be there. Not school time. 
There was another field on the side of the road. I was not sure whether I would fit in 
there. But I was thinking there would be less damage to anyone else. I should have 
communicated more with the ATC and been clearer about my condition. I verified my 
position then I decided. I just needed to get home…. I could not bring myself to declare 
a proper emergency. I had two-way communication and nobody in the air around…. 
In my mind if we declared a mayday I thought I was going to die.” 
 
Amelia also referred to skill-based errors through misunderstandings of the English 
language during flight and on the runways. In fact, both pilots agreed that there were issues in 
flight and misunderstandings of communication with English, especially the overuse of plain 
English as opposed to specific prescribed phraseology.  They both spoke of GA pilots who are 
not trained correctly on how to communicate and in emergency situations saying “no” instead of 
“negative” or “affirm” instead of “yes” which could lead to disastrous consequences.  
Over a decade ago, the International Civil Aviation Organization introduced rigorous 
English language proficiency testing for pilots and ATCs to improve communications and 
standardize aviation terminology (Emery, Roberts, Goodman & Harrison, 2008). While second 
language learners are also graded on their speaking and listening ability ranked from 1 to 6 in 





Amelia posited language communication problems in her daily activities;  
Yes, lots of miscommunication due to poor English. All the time. You hear it every day. 
Once I could not get a clearance back into the zone because somebody was flying in a 
circuit and they misunderstood the circuit direction. They could not understand 
English. And it was just a disaster. They would not let anyone back into that airspace 
until they had cleared that up.  Poor broken English and misunderstanding about 
clearance. 
 
The chief pilot Charlie was the only research participant that pointed to knowledge-based 
errors as opposed to skill-based errors.  First Charlie mentioned one incident where inaccurate 
information being broadcast from the ATC to him in a critical flying incident. Before 
committing to a flight, a large portion of a pilot’s daily activities is monitoring weather updates 
from the Bureau of Meteorology and/or the local ATC tower. Charlie said:  
This information from the ATC was too little and far too late. We were working with 
them to try to figure out the movement of the cells but unfortunately it was just between 
their lack of knowledge and mapping and my recognition. The ATC were behind, my 
autopilot was down and these things left me blind. It would have wasted time trying to 
troubleshoot. I found myself in the middle of my own personal light show with 
passengers on board and had to just go it alone…The ATC assisted me where they 
could but they inadvertently put me right in the middle of somewhere where I did not 
want to be.   
 
Charlie went on to give another example of a pilot lacking knowledge of an airfield on 
landing. Private pilots who are in charge of a GA flight are obligated to carefully gather all 
available information to safely plan for their proposed flight path. This means accessing weather 
forecasts, studying the routes, ensuring the aircraft is qualified to use them, the conditions of the 
airfields they are going to land in and all the rules and procedures associated with the region they 
intend to fly. Along with a precise fuel calculation the information required to successfully plan 
is critical to the final safe execution of the flight and the responsibility rests solely with the pilot.  
Charlie pointed to an incident;  
An incident last year occurred with a pilot leaving SA William Creek and leaving at last 





they arrived at the airport they could not turn the airfield lights on. They were not using 
the correct frequency. It was a fatality.  
Three quick pulses with a one second pause in between would have done it to turn the 
lights on over the airfield so that they could land safely but they were on the incorrect 
frequency.  This is a case of when a pilot just says I'll make it happen without any 
knowledge and it goes badly. 
 
Charlie went on to explain a term in aviation that is not recorded in the official 
regulations and rules by governing bodies called “gethomeitis”.  He expounded on this critical 
incident, where the pilot had inadequate information and proposed that this pilot had more than 
likely suffered “gethomeitis” by gravely ignoring the standard routine of researching unfamiliar 
airfields in order to meet a demanding personal schedule.  Charlie says:  
Yes, Gethomeitis or it is sometimes called Pushonitis because the pilot just pushes on. 
It affects private pilots probably more than commercial pilots in regards to their 
personal commitment to get somewhere fast. This feeling to get home overrules their 
judgement. They say to themselves I know I said we were going to leave at 4 but I think 
we can leave at 5. They have a level of fatigue that is wearing them down but they just 
want to get home after long multi-leg journeys. But they can’t do anything while they 
are up there. Like I say to my students, landings are mandatory but take offs are 
optional.  
 
Technological Response to Human Error 
The following section will discuss the principal technologies found to be used routinely 
by the pilots and engineers, during the collection of data at Fly-Past; aviation training devices, 
warning technologies in the cockpit of the aircraft and software that tracks and chronicles 
maintenance activities.  During the interviews both the pilots and the engineers referred to these 
technologies as helpful in assisting them to mitigate human error and make their regular working 
day safer. While Fly-Past offered some tools to assist and support humans in their safety-critical 
workplace, there were some technologies such as Augmented Reality (AR), that were non-
existent at the research site. This absence of technology will also be discussed in the findings of 





Aviation Training Device. 
An Aviation Training Device (ATD) is used at Fly-Past to train their pilots as opposed to 
a haptic, full flight simulator (FFS) that rather theatrically reproduces a mock flying atmosphere 
for a pilot so that they can sense and learn to control types of aircraft by physically responding to 
external forces such as wind shear, weather, changes in air density and turbulence.  The ATD, 
(pictured below in Figure 14) however, does have a replica of aircraft instruments, equipment, 
panels, and controls in an enclosed aircraft training room that resembles a cockpit and includes 
the hardware and software essential to represent the types of aircraft that Fly-Past operate.  
 
Figure 14. Image taken of ATD  
Warning Technologies in the Cockpit. 
Even though Fly-Past pilots are highly qualified CSIP (Cirrus Approved) Instructors that 
fly the range of Cirrus aircraft, they also hold endorsements on other aircraft that the safety-
critical organization owns and operates. In fact, the wide range of aircraft owned by Fly-Past 
offer quite diverse levels of technology in their cockpits, some more progressive than others.  For 
example, the Beechcraft Baron 58, the Cessna 172 (Figure 15) and the Piper Seneca do not offer 
the innovative safety features of the more advanced King Air B200 and two Cirrus aircraft SR20 





A clear illustration of the innovative features installed on both the Cirrus models of 
aircraft is the whole-plane ballistic parachute recovery system which enables a Cirrus trained 
pilot to deploy a parachute to bring an aircraft down safely in an emergency (Cirrus, 2020).  The 
Cirrus SR20 has an impressive Garmin 1000 perspective glass cockpit made up of two units that 
display a primary and a multi-function display as shown in Figure 16.  However, Fly-Past’s most 
sophisticated aircraft is the world’s best-selling GA aircraft which is the Cirrus SR22. This 
aircraft is fitted with a glass cockpit which also offers a remarkable integrated avionics suite.  
 
Figure 15. Image taken in Cessna 172 Cockpit on pre-flight check on the Fly-Past research site. 
Both pilots were quick to argue for the necessity for more warning technology in the 
cockpit of some of their older aircraft such as the Cessna 172.  They pointed to the use of the up 
to date flight deck displays and new technologies to support pilots in making decisions and 
mitigating error that are offered by the Cirrus range of aircraft. Ground proximity notices or 
announcements on the status of the various systems on the aircraft all help in feeding accurate 
information to pilots in flight, especially when the aircraft is in a mid-flight crisis.  
Amelia pointed to an example of a dangerous incident where she was flying in a Cessna 





“If I placed myself in that same scenario and placed myself in a Cirrus I would not 
have been so concerned. I could have gone more directly. I guess a little bit more 
information about the engine on my system in front of me would have been helpful. In 
that instance it would have made a difference because clearly something had broken 
but I had no information. Who knows what? I had no warnings.  I had nothing to tell 
me what was going on. There are no real warnings on the Cessna system. I saw the 




Figure 16. Image taken in Cirrus SR22 Cockpit. 
Tracking Aviation Maintenance Documents: Aerotrak. 
The maintenance repair workshop at the research site was supervised by Jet the chief 
engineer who was responsible for all operations associated with delivering safe aircraft to Fly-
Past pilots and external customers. Jet faced some challenging, time consuming administrative 
paperwork to meet complex operational and regulatory requirements as a representative of the 
organization.  Jet stated that he spent a large portion of his day searching for specific aircraft 





More importantly Jet had to ensure that the engineers not only were appropriately equipped with 
the right tools to accomplish their tasks safely but could do so in a timely manner.  In an 
increasingly regulated industry in Australia this administrative work added to Jet’s work load, 
however he welcomed the Aerotrak software to support his memory to track the numerous 
communications with customers about their aircraft, tools and tasks (Aerotrak, 2020). When I 
asked about the impact the extraordinary amount of paperwork has on his workload Jet 
responded:  
“I don’t think it delays or is a burden to me. In fact, I think the paperwork really helps 
me to remind me of what I have done. I think it makes it easier to not make a mistake. 
Everything has to be recorded in my job. I can sit through a work pack and read 
through it. My mind might go off my work but this tech makes it easier to go back to it. 
For example, someone might ring up and say they have an alternator issue on the left 
engine and I can pull the work pack. Hold on …I then find out it was the right engine. 
It helps me in real time. It is important.”  
 
The software package is an important technological tool for Jet because it is powerful 
enough to run inventory, job control, sales, labor tracking, maintenance control, regulatory 
compliance, document management and workshop tooling (Aerotrak, 2020).  
Safety-Critical Organization’s response to Human Error  
There were some significant examples of Fly-Past optimistically and effectively 
responding to and countering human error in their safety-critical organization.  However, in the 
course of collecting data, three routine practices in the organization stood out; the safety 
management system, duplicate inspections in maintenance and the emphasis on learning by 
watching, in training both pilots and engineers.  
Conversely, three further areas appeared to be less functional in addressing the risk in this 





excessive interruptions. The next section will attend to all these capacities where the safety-
critical organization is responding to human error.   
Safety Management System.  
Fly-Past’s mission is directed by the Australian government’s Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) to embrace a Safety Management System (SMS) to ensure effective 
organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures are securely in place (CASA, 
2020).  Fly-Past recently implemented a paperless SMS called Flight School Manager in 2019. 
While some of the accounts in the incident reports on Fly-Past’s SMS appeared scant and were 
generally ambiguous, with missing information about who was involved, how the event evolved 
and the types of tools and machines used in the incident, the safety-critical organization did 
employ a Safety and Compliance manager.  This manager held formal qualifications in Quality 
and Auditing to manage the SMS and ensured that the incidents were attended to and tools and 
resources were kept up to date in the organization. Following CASA rules and regulations, the 
SMS can be scalable to fit the size and complexity of the organization, and the safety manager at 
Fly-Past appeared to draw on various Safety policy and objectives, safety risk management 
methods, safety assurance and safety promotion to meet the regulations of this regulatory body.  
So, with respect to human proficiency and human error at Fly-Past, the organization’s 
initial response is to rely on a qualified Safety and Compliance manager to record on an SMS 
what mistakes the humans are making and then manage them through re-training and 
development.  
Consistent Duplicate Inspections. 
The Australian regulatory body, CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) also mandates 





carries significant risks to the successful flight of an aircraft if not performed properly, 
necessitates a secondary licensed engineer to carefully check the work.  These particular critical 
tasks are historically identified as previously not performed properly and need two licensed 
engineers to check the job is successfully completed to the correct standard.  
Both engineers relayed how Fly-Past entirely and responsively supported them in taking 
the time to perform full and detailed duplicate inspections. However, they conceded that working 
in a small to medium sized business means that you form intimate, unquestioning and inter-
reliant relationships with the other supervising engineer on the job. While the engineers mutually 
identified these trusting bonds between each other as a potential weak link when it came to 
performing a duplicate inspection, they were very aware of their responsibilities to perform 
inspections truthfully and precisely.  Jet explains why a licensed engineer erroneously and hastily 
signed off on a duplicate inspection without checking thoroughly:  
 “This lazy LAME told me later that he respected the engineer that is why he did not 
inspect the job properly. He felt like he did not want to tread on his toes. He had a 
lot of respect for him. He had a general lookover not with the depth he should of.” 
 
Jet went onto explain how he is intrinsically motivated to safeguard his license and 
viewed all duplicate inspections with the same level of microscopic attention, seriousness and 
professionalism. He defended his attitude to duplicate inspections by explaining that his 
livelihood was continually at risk and he was constantly guarding the authority of his license by 
saying: 
 “I don’t care who you upset. I don’t care if they think I am being pedantic. It is my 
license.” 
 
Learning by Watching.  
At Fly-Past, the LAMEs are responsible for the unlicensed apprentices who are on-the 





safety-critical organization advocates a strong case for encouraging the students to spend a lot of 
time observing before they actually are allowed to perform any critical tasks.  This style of 
observational learning includes watching experts, taking time to retain the information and then 
later on repeating and replicating the same actions that the student had observed. Amelia 
explains how too many pilot instructors relinquish the control of the aircraft to the student 
prematurely and do not offer enough time for the student to simply observe pilots flying.   
“Honestly, students make a lot of critical mistakes. That is why I push observations 
over learning by doing. It is because the cockpit is noisy, uncomfortable and hot and 
bumpy. It is not a good learning environment. The student gets overloaded. The biggest 
key is to watch for them being overloaded. I don’t talk about it while I am up there. I 
give them a brief five minutes while I demonstrate. I want to just demonstrate or show 
them. I need them to catch their breath. If they are becoming overloaded…. A lot of 
instructors try to give the controls too early. A second or third demonstration can be 
worth a lot of practices.” 
 
Amelia goes onto explain another critical incident that was avoided in flight as an 
example of how students learning to fly require a lot more time watching demonstrations as 
opposed to physically flying the aircraft independently:   
 
“Oh, one student over-flared during flight just yesterday and we had the potential to 
stall over the runway. So, I just identified it and took the controls away from him. I 
almost broke his hand the poor thing to take the throttle away from him. But here is 
another example of a student requiring more demonstrations rather than flying”. 
 
Charlie gives an example of where student pilots are too quick to want to fly instead of watch. 
He says; 
“Stalling is where most student make mistakes. I'll do it for them to model and they 
observe. I make sure they observe a few times before they practice. Observations are 
important sometimes more important at this stage than practice. They are always too 
quick to want to grab the controls and just do it. But I make sure they observe. Then 
they do it successfully.  They observe then practice and they do it perfectly.” 
 
I ask Jet the chief engineer if his apprentices ever make mistakes because they are 





“I cannot think of a time where an apprentice had ever made a critical mistake because 
mainly I do not allow apprentices to engage in critical work until they are really 
experienced and I trust them. I am not saying I don’t trust them. I just think they have 
a lack of knowledge. They need to watch me or someone else do it first. Not just once 
many many times.  I wait for their skill set to evolve. While they might get bored I don’t 
care about that. I get them to do mundane tasks, changing panels, tires, putting panels 
off and on, wheel bearings. Things that are easily detected. I tap all panels, and check 
the center nut of all the wheels they touch.  The whole time they are watching. That is 
a good thing. Just to watch.” 
 
Resistance to Emerging Technologies. 
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is Australia’s federal government body 
responsible for investigating transport-related accidents and incidents within the country and 
delineates Fly-Past as a GA safety-critical business (ATSB, 2020). According to the latest 
figures from the ATSB, GA operations are approximately nine times more likely to have an 
accident and fifteen times more likely to experience a fatal accident than a large commercial 
airline who principally operate the technologically up to date turbofan four engine aircraft 
(ATSB, 2019).  The ATSB reported that in 2017 there were 21 fatalities from 93 accidents in 
general aviation operations in Australia.    
Akin to the ATSB is the independent United States government agency, National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), responsible for accident investigations (NTSB, 2020). The 
NTSB also issued a similar statement in 2019 reflecting comparable numbers of fatalities in 
general aviation in the United States. However, these fatalities were on a larger scale and showed 
an increase from 347 fatalities in 2017 to 393 fatalities in 2018 (NTSB, 2020).  The NTSB 
Chairman Robert Sumwalt expressed his concern in the report of glaring safety deficiencies by 
stating, “Aviators in general aviation communities need to renew their emphasis on building and 
sustaining a safety culture, and recipients of our safety recommendations in this area need to 





So, the accident and fatal accident rates for GA in both Australia and the United States, 
reflects their riskier daily operating activity when likened to commercial air transport operations.  
Further while GA might have had an increase in reporting culture and general growth in small 
aircraft movements across these countries, a general consensus exists that operating a private air 
charter company nowadays is a very hazardous business (Fala & Marais, 2016; Karboviak, et al., 
2018; Puranik, Jimenez & Mavris, 2017; Shappell, et al., 2017).  
Presently Fly-Past are employing technologies such as ATD’s to deliver valuable 
demonstrations in their flight training, warning sensors in the cockpit to track the systems of the 
aircraft and weather with up-to-the-minute data being relayed to the pilot and maintenance 
tracking software to ensure their aircraft are satisfactorily maintained in real time.  This safety-
critical business is not only complying with all the regulations from the governing bodies but are 
in fact exceeding more than is generally expected for a small GA business with respect to 
technology in their training and aircraft systems to ensure their humans remain undamaged and 
their infrastructure stays intact.   
However, even with the concerning, fatal accident figures revealed in the GA model 
compared to large scale commercial enterprises in mind, Fly-Past, like many small private air 
charter companies, are still disinclined to follow their colleagues in the commercial airlines who 
are implementing innovative safety technologies (Ceruti, Marzocca, Liverani & Bil, 2019; De 
Crescenzio, et al., 2010; Eschen, Kötter, Rodeck, Harnisch & Schüppstuhl, 2018; Wang, Anne & 
Ropp, 2016). Still, this resistance to emerging or developed technologies, is not a simple 
academic activity of altering an organizational perspective but it is often about, “…vested 





exposes existing organizational stress, and can amplify it…These conflicts, though unsettling, 
are crucial to learning about safety.”  (Dekker, Siegenthaler & Laursen, 2007, p.4).  
At first glance, this resistance by Fly-Past to invest in new expensive technology seems 
reasonable and practical when the basic services of their GA business in comparison to the 
advanced commercial enterprises is reduced and insignificant.  It can be rationalized, that 
introducing unconventional emerging technologies that have not been fully established in the GA 
industry, might be considered not only risky and costly but simply overkill.  
Despite the countless studies on change management over time, a study from McKinsey 
& Co discloses that approximately 70% of all change proposals still fail today (Umble & Umble, 
2014).   The researchers propose three reasons why these failures occur in their Theory of 
Constraints; disagreement about the problem, the solution and about how it is implemented 
(Umble & Umble, 2014).  They suggest that buy in will occur if these differences are resolved.  
However, this appears too linear and simplistic, as even extremely skilled HRD professionals 
face ongoing, sometimes overwhelming, complications with workers who exhibit explosive 
emotions such as tendencies of strong cynicism, uncertainty and fear. So, a valid question 
remains on the underlying reason why people are likely to disagree to both problems and 
solutions to changes and how genuine are their objections.   
Most people view any loss at work as a danger to them as an individual and with this 
feeling comes enormous pressure.  When change is looming in the workplace, whether it is 
enormous or trifling, most workers intuitively weigh up whether the unit of loss appears bigger 
than an equivalent unit of gain (Beenen, 2016).  This is quite an understandable response, as loss 
of things like; loss of face, identity, belonging to a group, a specific role, a bonus or even a work 





response is common to change in an organization it should be viewed by HRD professionals as 
normal instead of being seen as an undesirable quality.  Normalizing the emotional reactions of 
workers and being sensitive to those feelings is the first step in the discussion on how to manage 
the change as it somehow prevents panic and the action of fight or flight.  
Six sources of resistance to change identified by Oreg’s (2003) research provides a 
comprehensive overview of why people oppose change; reluctance to lose control, cognitive 
rigidity, lack of psychological resilience, intolerance to the adjustment period involved, 
preference for low levels of stimulation and novelty, and reluctance to give up old habits.  Across 
a variety of diverse changes, four primary personality traits are offered of people who tend to 
resist change; those who seek routine, react emotionally, possess short-range focus, or are 
inflexible (Oreg, 2003).    
All these behaviors appear as flaws in the social attributes of a human yet, fourteen years 
later Oreg (2017) seems to make a slight shift to conceding that levels of resistance actually are 
heavily reliant on the context of the task.  Fundamentally, this means that it is far too general to 
suggest that the cause of the resistance comes from a definite place without examining the 
environment of the workplace and circumstance of the change.  
Cumulative Job Pressure. 
The Organization Development (OD) area within the categories of HRD is classified 
according to whether they underscore human relations and self-awareness, individual and group 
change or structural change (Jacobs, 2019).  A couple of decades ago, little attention was given 
to the concept of OD in the HRD literature with the investment on developing workers and the 





organizations is now considered a fundamental objective within HRD and HRD professionals 
have begun to appreciate the moral and ethical dimensions of this area of OD (Kuchinke, 2014).   
However, even though one of the goals of an HRD practitioner is to pursue fair outcomes 
for humans, many agendas in safety-critical organizations also have the potential to manipulate 
and exploit workers and viewed as “…intricately connected to the fate of any organization” 
(Swanson & Holton, 2009, p.10).  An obvious weight on humans to perform while they are tired 
or stressed regularly occurs in the aviation maintenance industry and stems from enormous 
pressures by the safety-critical businesses to safely dispense aircraft on time (Atak & Kingma, 
2011; Wiegmann, et al, 2005).  
Both engineers consistently presented this topic of job pressure and the tension of 
delivering a safe aircraft to the customer as a main source of human error and driver in making 
mistakes at work. There was a direct connection between being constantly subjected to daily 
external pressures by the owners and operators of aircraft to produce the maintained aircraft. 
Within the aviation industry, there are clearly regulated work and resting periods for air traffic 
controllers and flight crew, yet aviation maintenance engineers do not appear to have the same 
strictly controlled break requirements within the General Aviation community (CASA, 2020).   
 Baron states;  
“Nobody is making money while aircraft are sitting on the ground. So, there is this 
constant underlying bottom line pressure.”   
 
Furthermore, there appeared an understanding and unswerving agreement amongst the 
two engineers about how the lack of supervising engineers is directly connected to the engineer’s 
levels of fatigue.  The engineers defined fatigue not just by feeling drowsy or tired but as a state 





perform critical tasks effectively and safely (Yong, Lie, Calvert, 2017). Baron articulates the solo 
nature of a supervising licensed engineer by stating; 
“Quite often as a supervising engineer you are left alone at the end of a day after a 11-
hour shift or a late shift. This is where the trainees and apprentices leave but you are 
the one that has to sign off on the work. This is where you get tired and mistakes are 
made.”   
  
The responsibility of signing out an aircraft can weigh heavily on an exhausted solitary 
engineer, on a night shift particularly when they are undertaking critical tasks that require a high 
level of attentiveness and concentration. In a small to medium sized business, like Fly-Past, 
licensed engineers work autonomously and perform critical tasks individualistically but 
functioning alongside other licensed engineers operating in a robust collaboration. This enables 
engineers to feedback ideas and troubleshoot together in an important community of practice. 
Baron says,  
“I know myself when I am working through things I usually go and ask a crusty old 
engineer how to do something. The book says this but it really is meaning this. When I 
was trained and flying I feel so privileged to be trained by some people with a depth of 
knowledge…It saves so much time. I often call people or other people call me about 
undercarriage or rigging problems” 
 
Constant Interruptions. 
During one observation at the aviation engineering maintenance hangar, I noted that the 
chief engineer was interrupted on fourteen different occasions while he was working on a 
100-hour service of a Piper aircraft. For instance, Jet was intermittently interrupted over the 
course of about three hours by the owner of the aircraft, the director of the company, the 
apprentices, a waste management company and the other lead engineers. Jet describes these 
interruptions as expected and standard daily occurrences.  He goes onto explain his strategies 





“Interruptions are just a part of my day. I have a lot of hats. I train, order parts, deal 
with customers, speak to reps, maintain the hangar. But what is the most important 
thing for me is I am careful when and what tasks I assign people and when I start a 
certain task. After lunch breaks is important. The timing is critical. For example, you 
don’t put an oil filter on and then go and have lunch and then go lock wire it. We have 
a rule down there that critical tasks should be completed in one session. I quite often 
see engineers doing a critical task and will opt to work through lunch in order to 
complete the task all in one go. That is a fair way – no interruptions for them. For me 
it is a different story I have lots.” 
 
Summary of Findings 
The examination of the documents at Fly-Past along with the interviews of the aviation 
maintenance engineers and the pilots have provided a concrete framework to display what I 
uncovered at the site, guided by the three sub-research questions.  This chapter has first 
catalogued the different types of human error I found through reading the incident reports and 
listening to the humans who perform high consequence tasks at the site. Each incident was 
designated a skill, knowledge or rule-based error according to Rasmussen’s SKR approach 
(Rasmussen, 1986). Next, a description followed of the response by Fly-Past to mitigate human 
error by using technologies such as; ATDs, warning systems in up-to-date cockpits and tracking 
applications for maintenance records. Moreover, this section also offered an example of a 
developed technology, AR, that was not found at the site.  
It then explained further how the safety-critical organization responds in general to 
humans who are performing high consequence tasks. It expounded on some operations and 
initiatives by Fly-Past that have appeared to show an obviously constructive and positive impact 
at the site such as; reinforcing an efficient SMS with a qualified Safety and Compliance 
manager, minimizing risk thorough duplicate inspections and supporting learning by observing 
tasks, rather than learning by doing in their training.  Alternatively, this chapter finished by 





observations. For example, features that possibly could show an objectionable value on humans 
who perform high consequence tasks were; consistent remarks about snowballing job pressure, 
endless interruptions in some workflows and an indication that there existed a resistance to 
emerging technologies within the safety-critical organization.  
 The over-arching question of this research is addressed in the discussion section of the 
subsequent final Chapter five which concentrates on whether technology mitigated and/or 
exacerbated human error in this safety-critical organization. Then, I re-visit Rasmussen’s SKR 
approach (Rasmussen, 1986) as a catalyst to discuss a possible missing element that has been 
overlooked in this taxonomy, associated with the future of our high-tech workplace; innovation-
based errors. In my concluding suggestions for further investigation I propose the necessity for 
building stronger communities of practice in GA industries and the impact HRD will have on 






CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Introduction 
This final section begins with a discussion that addresses the over-arching question of 
this research that inquired whether technology helps or hinders the humans who make human 
errors while working at, Fly-Past. Following this, I make a further commentary of Rasmussen’s 
SKR taxonomy and broaden his error classification with an extra division related to innovation-
based errors. These innovation-based errors are further apportioned into first describing how the 
human sometimes fails to communicate their innovative ideas and secondly how the organization 
sometimes decides to overlook the opinions of an individual human and fails to implement 
innovations.  This chapter settles on an argument for the benefits of forming Communities of 
Practice (COPs) within the global GA sector and ends with speaking to the significance of HRD 
and the implications HRD has for improving safety-critical workplaces in the future.  
Discussion 
Before satisfying this query of whether technologies help or hinder humans who make 
human errors, it should be stated from the outset, that it is highly unlikely that the positioning of 
any technological systems in any safety critical workplace, will ever completely eliminate all 
human errors (Foord & Gulland, 2006; Reason, 2000). The data collected at this research site, 
Fly-Past, along with the comprehensive review of the literature on human error, has shown that 
humans are interwoven in every aspect of the safety-critical systems they work within such as; 
executing needs analyses, planning and designing, triggering actions by applying their skills, 
rules and knowledge and of course maintaining all the structures that they operate. What this 
means is, with the risk of announcing the categorically obvious, all of the incidents referred to in 





question still remains about whether technologies reduce or increase the chances of human error 
occurring on this site.  
Additionally, the human interaction with safety critical systems seems to activate the 
natural disposition of humans to invent, innovate and solve problems. Yet, because   
safety-critical organizations are understandably risk-averse, they are not leaving room for human 
intervention to innovate and ultimately improve and sustain better practices.  
Technologies that Mitigated Human Error at the Site 
The research site of Fly-Past is a great illustration of how the human intervenes and 
interacts with the aircraft at every stage of the distinctly different workflows of air charter, flight 
training and maintaining aircraft. The incident reports and interviews with the pilots and 
engineers reflected this perpetual element of risk of human error at every phase.  
With respect to the question of whether technology assists humans making human errors in the 
safety-critical organization, there was a clear indication that Fly-Past did make respectable 
consistent attempts at removing or at least reducing the opportunities for human error.   
For example, while the older style Cessna aircraft did not offer much in the way of 
progressive technology the more modern Cirrus aircraft at Fly-Past used warning technologies in 
the cockpit which enabled the pilot to receive up-to-the-minute data about the critical systems on 
the aircraft. As already stated, fatalities due to technical lapses or mechanical failures in aviation 
have decreased globally, while technological advances in onboard computer automation has 
increased and greatly assisted humans in the cockpit (Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2017).  
Additionally, along with warning and auto-pilot technology, prevailing aviation training 
devices were used to train the pilots and up-to-date software installed to maintain aviation 





for all their critical tools and tasks.  Additionally, a current SMS reporting software supported a 
Safety and Compliance manager who reported the human errors that occurred in the air charter, 
flight school and maintenance departments.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that while the traditional system of manually controlling 
an aircraft has persisted in GA industries, in larger commercial operations it has been replaced 
with digital Fly-by-wire (FBW) and this essentially means the human moves the controls with a 
technologically advanced electronic interface which has helped decrease the danger of flight-
related deaths. Some even credit the 2009 US Airways Flight 1549 infamous landing on the 
Hudson River, to FBW and Captain Sully’s flying skills, saving 155 humans on board 
(Langewiesche, 2009; McCall, 2017).  
Technologies that Exacerbated Human Error at the Site 
 The opposite aspect of the overarching research question of this study was to gauge 
whether the presence of any technologies have left the human less able to do their job safely and 
makes them more disposed to making errors. The chief pilot, Charlie concurs with the literature 
that it is critical to train pilots to not completely rely on automation technology, especially under 
strenuous flight conditions (Bainbridge, 1983; Endsley & Strauch, 1997; Mehta, Rice & Winter, 
2014).   
Technologies that automatically update pilots or engineers who then become over 
dependent on those systems can be of some concern because if the machineries collapse and fail, 
the human needs to swiftly access their own skills and knowledge of the critical task, in order to 
troubleshoot the issue. Charlie explains an incident where he experienced dangerous weather 





complement the abilities of the pilot, it is not something for the pilot to exclusively rely on. He 
says; 
“The ATC was behind and it left me blind. Then the autopilot also failed me when I 
needed it most but it is not supposed to be there to fly the plane for me. There are 
limitations with the autopilot so therefore it couldn't sustain the aircraft in those kinds 
of lightning strikes. The autopilot failed. It momentarily lapsed us into an unusual 
attitude which required more skill than…oh well I guess you could say it required my 
full attention and all my skill at the time to bring my aircraft back into normal 
operations Sure, it is supposed to contain the fallout from the human mistakes we make. 
But we don’t rely on it. I was stuck in a bad storm with people on board and just flew 
it myself. We need to know how to do it on our own.”  
 
So, for all the technological advancements in automation in aviation, it appears that the 
success of technologies such as these might be expressed as merely useful rather than attending 
to or addressing the real underlying issue of human error (Bainbridge, 1983). If the pilot or 
engineer is trusting the technology too heavily then this in itself is a human error and what is 
really needed is more training in specific skill sets that actually complement the technology.  
A more recent instance of over-reliance on technology occurred in 2013 on a very clear 
morning at San Francisco International Airport, where the captain of Asiana Airlines flight 214 
selected an inappropriate autopilot mode with a well-defined, final visual approach and crashed 
with their landing gear hitting the seawall, short of the runway (Chow, Yortsos & Meshkati, 
2014). While in some circumstances the human’s skills and knowledge are limited and 
technology is implemented to caution them, in other cases the human gravely holds the belief 
that the technology will completely regulate that risk instead of relying on their own skills and 
knowledge. 
Augmented Reality. 
I noticed that, although fly past is a very up-to-date enterprise with modern well-equipped 





technologies that could assist the human working on critical tasks.  GA businesses like Fly-Past 
might still stand to show some curiosity in the technological devices that commercial operations 
are starting to appreciate. At the very least, GA does offer similar services to the community as 
commercial airlines but just on a smaller scale. For example, Fly-Past carry passengers, train 
pilots and maintain aircraft with similar high-risk processes, parallel critical tasks and hazardous 
activities and very often similar goals, just like the larger commercial airlines.   
One example of technology not found on the research site at Fly-Past was Augmented 
Reality (AR). AR has been applied in many areas within the commercial aviation industry and 
especially presented as a technology that advances the quality and delivery of aviation 
maintenance training (Ceruti, Marzocca, Liverani, & Bil, 2019; De Crescenzio, et al., 2010; 
Macchiarella & Vincenzi, 2004; Pereira, Moore, Gheisari, & Esmaeili, 2019; Wang, Anne, & 
Ropp, 2016). AR was first introduced over twenty years ago in Azuma’s influential conference 
paper but is now a developed technique used in the commercial airlines (Azuma, 1997).  
Developed from the Virtual Reality (VR) industry AR uses computer graphics and symbols 
overlaid on an actual image of the external world as shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18. The 
visual displays in AR offer the human an interactive interface with an authentic well 
recognizable back drop of their safety-critical setting, compared to traditional paper-based 






Figure 17. Cessna 337 and particular of the main gear door (left); Cessna illustrated part 
catalogue of the Main Gear Door (right), “aft hinge” part encircled, image taken from 
Maintenance in aeronautics in an Industry 4.0 context: The role of Augmented Reality and 
Additive Manufacturing, by A. Ceruti, P. Marzocca, A. Liverani, & C. Bil, C, 2019. 
 
 
Figure 18. Cessna 337 task highlighted in the menu and augmented scene of a bracket, image 
taken from Maintenance in aeronautics in an Industry 4.0 context: The role of Augmented 
Reality and Additive Manufacturing, by A. Ceruti, P. Marzocca, A. Liverani, & C. Bil, C, 2019 
 
Whilst the VR in engineering and flight simulators do not offer much in the way of actual 





AR presents an opportunity for critical tasks to be highlighted within the actual environment of 
the human who is undertaking the high consequence tasks. Baron the lead engineer talked 
frankly about the difficulties of following some of the aircraft maintenance manuals that are 
attached to each aircraft and confirmed the attraction of AR.  Baron said; 
“To be honest, sometimes it is difficult to understand what the manual is trying to say. 
The black and white drawings do not show the complexities of the task. It is not always 
distinguishable in the manual - more images would be better.  I saw the other day in a 
fairly complex task of fitting a fuel control unit on a turbine engine that the company 
sent a video of the whole task. I think it was rigging of an aircraft. I think this type of 
training video is better than reading a manual. This was brilliant because it actually 
started by stripping the whole control system down and building it back up again. This 
is a really excellent way of showing an engineer a whole process. And that's a good 
way a lot of people learn.  It is much better visually to learn something as an engineer. 
Visual are clearer not vague manual”  
 
Furthermore, AR can be used in Head Mounted Displays (HMD) or see-through glasses 
where the virtual objects, like complex components of aircraft are stored in a database and then 
directly linked to HMD so that as the human moves their head the symbol positions itself on the 
external reference system and guides human performing the high consequence task (Ceruti, 
Marzocca, Liverani & Bil, 2019). Baron went onto explain that access to information in real time 
is important while he is performing the critical tasks on the aircraft. Baron said;  
 “Try reading from a manual when you have your head in an engine. Sometimes I need 
more hands so I have thought about those heads up displays but not sure how I would 
go with that but being hands free. It would help not stopping and crawling out from 
under the belly of the aircraft to check a manual Yeah sure that would help” 
 
There were clear demonstrations of lack of situational awareness and improper 
movements around the airfield and in the hangar at the research site, which became evident in 
the incident reports and interviews. Amelia says; 
Yeah well you just need to have situational awareness…there was a case in Latrobe 
valley. A guy on his second solo had absolutely no idea that someone was in front of 





turbulence. But all of it is environmental you gotta look around. Students get too close 
to other aircraft on the runway or don’t stop. Runway near misses happen a lot here. 
 
Safe airfield movements are of critical importance and great concern for safety-critical 
organizations like Fly-Past who share and use the airport to train student pilots and maintain 
their aircraft. Since the infamous 1977 runway collision of two Boeing 747 aircraft in the Canary 
Islands which resulted in the death of 583 passengers and flight crew members, the aviation 
industry has progressively improved technology to control airspace and ground movements 
(Donovan, Matus & Solomon, 2014).  
The incident reports and interviews reflected critical incidents on the airfield like, the 
movement of re-positioning aircraft in and outside the hangar by the engineers or student pilots 
being involved in near misses on the runway which corresponded to the data offered by the 
ATSB that shows runway events and loss of control of an aircraft were the most common types 
of incidents reported in GA in 2017 (ATSB, 2020).  In fact, according to ICAO (International 
Civil Aviation Organization) unsafe events on the airfield accounted for 14% of fatal accidents in 
2015 (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2015). Further as airfield incidents have 
increased more safety-critical organizations have started to implement situational awareness 
technology to reduce incursions, like google street view style maps of airfields and more robust 
visual aids to assist the human (Major & Hubbard, 2017). Further video tracking devices that 
detect unsuitable activity such as monitoring humans who are not wearing the appropriate 
personal protective equipment or an incorrect location are being developed and implemented in 
safety-critical organizations (Blasch, Wang, Shen, Chen, & Ling, 2014; Hauer, 2018). 
So, emerging or developing technologies such as augmented reality for training, special 
cameras to detect fatigue, sensors to perceive lack of personal protective equipment, instruments 





to hold enormous potential for Fly-Past. The following section examines the how the 
organization responds to address human errors and a supplementary inquiry subsequently arose 
from the research asking why smaller GA safety-critical organizations like Fly-Past fail to 
implement these developing or emerging technologies like larger commercial airlines. 
Re-visiting Skills, Knowledge and Rule Based Errors. 
As previously stated in this paper, the SKR approach has been shown in numerous 
journals by Rasmussen who proposed a valuable classification system for understanding not only 
the types of errors that occur in safety-critical workplaces but also the reasons for the mistakes 
(Figure. 2) (Rasmussen, 1982, 1987).  After a human error occurs an investigator can identify 
and classify specific skills, knowledge and rules that were unsuccessfully applied by the human. 
The aim of the analysis is to evaluate what level of skill was engaged, whether the human 
possessed knowledge of how to perform the task and what they comprehended about the rules 
associated with the critical task.   
Rule based errors stem from a failure of delivery of the rules and regulations from the 
organization to the human and/or there has been a failure by the human to understand this 
transfer of vital communication.  For example, the engineers at Fly-Past are constantly reminded 
by regulatory bodies of the stringent rules and regulations surrounding the best practices of both 
verbal and written handovers of work packs while maintenance is being done on critical 
components on the aircraft.    If a skill-based error occurs it usually means that the human has 
either missed a critical step in a procedure, mishandled a tool or device and/or used an incorrect 
tool or device. Ultimately the human demonstrates that they physically are unable to perform the 





mentally prompted by shadowing steps to follow in an aircraft maintenance manual but 
physically responding with tools to complete the task.  
Many knowledge-based errors performed by a human appear when they either fail to 
understand or lack familiarity with the information provided for the critical task. An example of 
a pilot drawing upon their knowledge was apparent at Fly-Past while they were undertaking pre-
flight checks. Notably, a novice student pilot on a pre-flight check was consistently and 
consciously referring to a physical checklist to remind them what to examine on a walk around 
the aircraft while the more experienced Fly-Past pilot undertook this critical task more easily 
from their previously stored data bank of knowledge, namely their memory.  
Of course, skill, knowledge and rule-based errors sometimes overlay in real time and 
humans have the potential to experience a failure of one or all three modes of operation in a 
single critical incident.  For example, it is possible that a human can be assigned a high 
consequence task with insufficient skills, unfamiliar knowledge of the steps in the task and no 
understanding of the rules and regulations connected to the critical nature of the task.  In fact, 
Reason (1990) built upon the SKR approach and described how humans regularly shift between 
the various modes of processing information in order to execute a critical task, successfully.  For 
example, if a human is having some challenges performing a skills-based action they might refer 
to a knowledge based or rules-based approach in order to resolve the matter. The daily reality of 
an aviation engineer is constantly applying strategies to find patterns that match the regulations 
that guide them, manuals they have been dispensed by the aircraft manufacturer and the 
components that require repair.   
However, from my research, there were some instances where certain types of errors did 





system when a human did not speak up about their innovative idea. For example, Baron the lead 
engineer says;  
“I mean even using tablets to show engine fuel patterns and all that sort of stuff 
visually. This would be good. It would be even better to see as I am working, instead 
of stopping and starting to look at manuals down on the hangar floor. So difficult to 
see inside too. I know it sound funny but it would be good to have x-ray vision 
sometimes.”  
 
While GA safety critical organizations might view these types of advanced ideas as an 
overindulgence or even fantasy and are generally not equipped to implement such forward-
thinking technologies into their workplaces, I found in the literature there were other instances 
where organizations were not effective in developing positive relationships in their teams, to 
ensure high levels of contributions by their humans and professional, mutual respect and sharing 
of new ideas (Schwartz & Wald, 2003; Ward, Ravlin, Klaas, Ployhart & Buchan, 2016).  
Considering Innovation-Based Errors 
Many safety-critical organizations appreciate that effectively engaging and developing 
humans to ensure they are competent enough to carefully perform high consequence tasks in a 
safety-critical workplace involves assessing their level of skills, knowledge of their tasks and 
familiarity with the rules and regulations of their particular industry (Dekker, 2017; Hollnagel, 
Woods & Leveson, 2006).  In order to mitigate human error, of course it is essential for safety-
critical organizations to close the skills gap, to re-train and re-enforce company policy so that 
these skills, rules and knowledge are firmly in place. However, humans have an enormous 
capacity to accomplish complex tasks and draw upon strengths that reach far beyond merely 
following rules, building their skill set or gaining knowledge about their particular job.  
Humans do in fact have the capacity to be inventive and innovative and demonstrate a 





by nature but are social creatures who develop and grow their skills sets over their careers. 
Humans are personally and culturally driven by distinctly different standards and values and 
often generate unusual and new ideas that positively guide how they behave in the workplace. 
Those individual humans, especially those who work in safety-critical workplaces on the 
frontline, like engineers and pilots, draw upon that distinctive resourcefulness on a daily basis to 
perform critical tasks, alone. At other times they work together to develop innovative ways of 
solving complicated problems that are exclusively connected to those critical tasks. Sometimes 
humans fail to speak up and communicate that innovative idea and this can be viewed as an 
innovation-based error as shown in Figure 19.  
While humans are inventive and imaginative and often demonstrate the ability to 
revolutionize their critical tasks, they actually need a venue that allows them to be openly 
acknowledged to communicate those innovative ideas. It is the responsibility of the safety-
critical organizations to encourage those humans who are working at the sharp end to 
unreservedly volunteer their opinions and innovative ideas (Donovan, Salmon, Horberry & 
Lenné, 2018; Tucker & Tucker, 2015). Creating the right conditions and providing a comfortable 
environment for a human to share their thoughts and feel safe enough to have a voice to discuss 
their ideas is imperative for safety-critical organizations (Brache & Rummler, 2013; Detert & 
Burris, 2016; Edmondson, 1999, 2003, 2018; Nemeth, 1992; Schwartz & Wald, 2003; Ward, 
Ravlin, Klaas, Ployhart & Buchan, 2016). So, as shown in Figure 19, innovation-based errors can 
occur when the safety-critical organization overlooks or disregards the ideas of individual 
humans. If the safety-critical organization does not openly and transparently provide that 
backdrop for their humans to contribute, then this could be viewed as the organization failing to 






Figure 19. R.I.S.K Human Error Classification 
In 2018, Chapman University delivered the results of a Survey of American Fears where 
a random sample of 1,190 adults from across the United States were asked their level of fear 
about ninety-four different phenomena including crime, the government, the environment, 
disasters, personal anxieties and technology (Chapman University, 2018). The survey revealed 
that humans were more afraid of computers replacing people in the workforce (ranked it at 48) 
than of dying (ranked at 54).  It is entirely possible then that those responsible for implementing 
innovative ideas especially related to technology, in their safety-critical organization might be 
resisting the opportunity to change due to a fear that technology might be overly disruptive.  
Suggestions for Further Investigation 
Communities of Practice in the General Aviation Industry.  
Manufacturers regularly focus on aircraft design with respect to producing aircraft that 
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on the design with maintenance in mind, to support engineers in their working environments who 
need to do close inspections and repair. Both engineers at Fly-Past reflected on specific high 
consequence tasks that sometimes would become challenging, complex and problematic to 
repair.   Sometimes these difficulties were due to the particular design of the component and they 
both remarked especially on mechanisms that were difficult to see and ultimately access as 
shown in figure 20. 
   
Figure 20. Image taken of Close Inspection & compression testing of Cessna 172 at the research 
site.  
Essentially the aircraft engineers believe that more manufacturers need to be sensitive to 
their complex and demanding tasks and more open to welcoming feedback information from 
them about their design recommendations. The practice of communicating openly between the 
manufacturers and the humans who are working on their machines means that a positive 
contribution is being made to safety within the aircraft industry globally. Being able to feedback 
information in a swift and effective manner to the manufacturer of the aircraft about the 





important to Jet.  He gives an example of a multifaceted component that was also difficult to 
view and the consequences of poor design of an aircraft. 
He says; 
“The engineer made a critical fault but there was a design fault. Poor design. There 
was a channel that you can’t see in. The two cables were not pulled through properly 
and not lined up so the bolt and nut were not done up and it was so very difficult to see. 
Really it was a very bad design. The two cables had to be inserted from two different 
sides of the channel.” 
 
Jet also goes onto provide an instance of a successful outcome from contacting the 
manufacturer because he felt the scheduled task was excessive and unwarranted. He says; 
 “For example, every hundred-hour service on the cirrus you used to have to take off 
the aileron and lock it. I sent an email saying that this introduces unnecessary risk with 
human error. They now no longer require you to do this. This one stands in my mind. 
It is only a basic task but if you get it wrong you can have a flight control issue. It is 
only a few bolts but if you get it wrong then it becomes critical.”  
 
Further, the engineers themselves rely on their own informal communities of practice as 
shown in figure 21, to build upon conversations about maintenance trends and challenges in their 
daily critical tasks.  Baron explains the importance of preserving networks and supporting each 
other;  
“Sometimes I am reading a maintenance manual especially if it is from another country 
and it might be in English but it may as well be a different language. I know myself 
when I am troubleshooting things I usually go and go phone a friend…ask a crusty old 
engineer how to do something. The book says this but it really is meaning this. I feel so 
privileged to be trained by some people with such a depth of knowledge and I still rely 
on them…the ones that are alive anyway... I have a little black book of defects. It gives 
me tips and memory triggers. People call me now and I go to my black book to 
troubleshoot. It is just jogging your memory on that particular defect. It saves so much 
time. I often call people or other people call me about undercarriage or rigging 







Figure 21. Communities of Practice in Aviation Industries 
Implications for HRD Practitioners in Safety-Critical Organizations 
To sanction a safe space where humans can develop their imagination and use their 
inventiveness to improve safety within their workplace, is pertinent to training and development 
within safety-critical organizations.  A focus on human development and better communication 
calls for an increase in the current resource allocation of training offered to humans in a safety-
critical workplace, which needs to be vibrant and dynamic to cater for the diverse nature of 
knowledge (Wang & Sun, 2018). Waight (2005) claimed that HRD practitioners will be 
“…crucial to unravelling the creative outputs that can be achieved from a diverse workforce” 
(p.154).  Mis-communications are common in environments where different generations are 

















learning and on the job training.  In a safety-critical organization confusion over varied or 
ambiguous messages puts humans in a precarious position of responsibility and at a higher risk 
of making human errors. 
So, humans have intrinsic cultural values that offer shape to their innovative ideas in a 
safety-critical workplace along with obligatory skills and an ever-shifting knowledge base. In an 
ideal, competently functioning safety-critical organization, all of these positive makings of being 
human, should be fully supported, fairly evaluated and efficiently developed by specialized, 
well-informed HRD practitioners.  Equally, the human must feel unhindered and confident 
enough to be able to speak up, take premeditated, measured risks to innovate and be empowered 
by their organization to adapt to these ongoing technological changes. 
Ultimately, the HRD practitioners’ role is to empower humans to have open discussions 
about their safety-critical workplace so that the human can accomplish their own personal and 
professional goals in both a cost effective, productive, yet comfortable safety-critical workplace. 
The HRD practitioner who reflects on all the possible outcomes and is willing to embrace all 
moral and ethical attitudes, even the resistors to innovative change, will offer the most potential 
for all-inclusive change and effective development for any safety-critical organization 
Final Conclusion 
While this research studied a small number of humans in specific circumstances, dealing 
with particularly sensitive safety-critical issues, my research questions demonstrate that my main 
intention was to consistently preserve the human at the center of the wider safety-critical 
organizational context.  The main strength of this malleable design, apart from highlighting the 
obvious intellectual and cerebral high-level competences of the human, was to show that humans 





to complete complicated, multifaceted physical tasks. Throughout the research experience I 
embraced the over-arching declaration that safety-critical organizations are only as successful as 
their processes. This idea was driven by the belief that all stakeholders in safety-critical 
organizations are deeply connected and auspiciously share the identical interpretation of human 
error, that it is inevitable.  
So, if we consider Plutarch’s remark ‘To err is human…’ and reason that it holds some 
conviction, we must also believe that humans do not turn up for work every day in their safety-
critical workplace with the intention to harm themselves, others or the equipment around them. 
With this noble idea in mind, that making mistakes is a natural phenomenon and that humans are 
socially intelligent creatures, this research carefully measured the SKR human error 
classification system against the existing state of human errors found at a research site, a GA 
private air charter business.   
The research uncovered a missing link in the SKR human error model, showing that 
humans in the workplace are made up of more than skills, knowledge and rules-based errors but 
also habitually practice innovation-based errors.  Sometimes resistance to innovative ideas stem 
from the individual human, other times the innovation-based errors come from the leaders in the 
safety-critical organization who disregard the opinions of the individual.  To conclude, I 
acknowledge that at this time it could be viewed as excessive for the GA industries to implement 
developed machinery such as AR into their safety-critical workplaces, to combat human error.  
Yet, for the sake of my enthusiasm for developed technologies to be thrust to the foreground in 
GA industries, I suggest that the HRD practitioner’s role is fundamental in better engaging 





sense of technological data sharing and curiosity in how these technologies might help reduce 
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My name is Sarah Dyer and I am a doctoral student at the University of Illinois in Urbana-
Champaign, USA. I am conducting a research study to investigate the perceptions and 
experiences of personnel in safety critical industries in relation to adopting technologies, to 
reduce human error.  I believe that gathering an understanding of your experiences will improve 
and advance the nature of safety critical workplaces. 
 
I am emailing to ask if you would like to take some time to be interviewed (45 minutes x 2) and 
be observed over one regular shift pattern of work during the January to March, 2020 time 
period. Approximately 4-6 people will take part in this qualitative study and participation is 
completely voluntary.  You will not be identified in the study and your answers will be 
anonymous. 
If you are interested, please let me know a suitable time for us to have an initial conference to 
meet and complete an informed consent form.  This will give you an opportunity to ask more 
about my research study. 
 
If you have any questions, before the meeting please do not hesitate to contact me via email or 
on 0466309111. 
I appreciate and thank you for your time. 
 
Sarah K. Dyer 
BSoSc, M.A.App.L 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
EdD - Education Policy, Organization, Leadership 
Concentration in Human Resource Development  
Dissertation Topic: Understanding Human Relationships with Automation, Artificial 













APPENDIX B: INITIAL PROCEDURE MEETING  
Initial Interview: (Scheduled for November 2019) 
 
1. Arrive at the agreed upon interview site. Initiate the verbal exchange with an 
introduction to the study and ask for the participant’s permission to begin digitally 
recording. 
 
2. Review the inclusion criteria to ensure the participant is eligible for the study. 
 
3. Present the informed consent information and the corresponding form. Allow time for 
the participant to review the form and verbally summarize the information on the 
form. 
 
4. Ensure the participants that as a researcher I am motivated by the belief that people 
who perform high consequence tasks are expert and trained in highly regulated 
safety-critical industries and are not driven to deliberately make mistakes at work. My 
examination of human error is not focused on violations but on execution and 
planning failures related to unintentional mistakes.  
 
5. Answer any questions or concerns that the participant has about informed consent. 
 
6. After the participant signs the consent form, explain the purpose of the study and 
assignment of the pseudonym for confidentiality purposes.  
 
7. Summarize the transcription process of the interview and steps to ensure 
confidentiality. Provide a timeline for the interview. 
 
8. Ask and confirm Demographic Questions: 
I. What is your gender? 
II. What is your age? 
III. What ethnicity do you identify as? 
IV. What is your profession? 
V. What is your job title? 
VI. How many years have you been employed in your particular profession? 
VII. How many years have you worked in this organization?  
 
Conclude the interview with a reminder and assurance about confidentiality and confirm 






APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
HUMAN ERROR AND INTERACTIONS WITH TECHNOLOGY IN SAFETY-
CRITICAL WORKPLACES: LEARNING FROM THE AVIATION INDUSTRY 
 
Consent to Participate in the Research Study 
Principal Researcher: Sarah Dyer  
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Scagnoli 
Instructions:  
Please read the consent form carefully and take your time about deciding to participate, as the 
researcher discusses this consent form with you. Please ask her to explain any words or 
information that you do not clearly understand. The purpose of the study, risks, inconveniences, 
discomforts and any other relevant information about the study are listed below.  If you decide to 
participate you will be a given a copy of this form.  
 
Why is this study being done? 
This study is being done to investigate the perceptions and experiences of emergency department 
personnel in regards to adopting human-AI technologies in a safety critical workplace to reduce 
human error.  The researcher believes that an understanding of your experiences will help 
improve and advance the nature of safety-critical workplaces.  
 
Why is this considered research? 
This is a research study because the researcher is asking you to provide information about your 
experiences in a real-world setting.  
 
Do I have to participate in this study? 
No. You have the right to choose whether or not you want to take part in this study. If you decide 
to participate and later change your mind, you have the option to stop participation at any time. If 
you decide to stop participating at any time, all the information that you have provided will be 
destroyed and omitted from this study.  
 
How many people will take part in the study? 
Approximately six individuals will participate in the study. 
 
What is involved in the study? 
If you volunteer in the research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form, participate in 
an initial interview, be observed on one shift and answer any additional follow up questions the 
researcher might have in a second interview.  
 
Will the interviews be recorded?  






How long can I expect to be in the study? 
You will be asked to complete the consent form prior to the engagement of the study.  Following 
completion of the form, you will participate in one 45 to 60-minute interview in January, 2020.  
Upon completion of the interview, you will be observed by the researcher on one weekend 12-
hour shift in February, 2020.  After the observation you will be asked by the researcher if she can 
follow up with any questions that may arise from the first interview and observation.  The follow 
up interview will take approximately 30 minutes to complete.  However, if you decide to 
discontinue participation at any time you will be immediately released from the study and any 
information collected will be destroyed.  
 
What are the risks of the study? 
Study procedure 
The study does not involve the administration of any medical procedure or test interventions. It 
has received a notice of exempt determination from the IRB at the University of Illinois. At this 
time there are no known physical risks with participation in the research protocol.  
It is viewed under the LNR pathway (Low negligible risk). Low and Negligible Risk in research 
is defined as a project in which there is no foreseeable risk of discomfort or harm and if there is 
any foreseeable risk, it will not be of more than inconvenience.  
Psychological Stress 
Some of the questions that the researcher will ask you as a part of the study may make you feel 
uncomfortable.  If any questions cause distress you may discuss its importance with the 
researcher.  After discussing the question, if you still feel uncomfortable you may refuse to 
answer the question. You may also take a break or stop your participation in this study at any 
time.  
Loss of Confidentiality 
Any time information is collected; there is a potential risk for loss of confidentiality. Every effort 
will be made to keep your information confidential.  
 
How will risks be minimized or prevented? 
During the course of this research study, if you experience any emotional or psychological 
difficulties you will be referred to appropriate service providers for interventions. To help protect 
the confidentiality of your personal information, the researcher will limit the personal identifiers 
collected and stored in the research record.  Your collected research record will be maintained in 
a secure, double locked facility and only the researcher will have access to your research record. 
All electronic research records will be maintained on a secure, stand-alone computer not 
connected to any network and accessible only to the researcher.  All data sets used for data 
analysis will be coded and de-identified and accessible only to the researcher. When the study is 
completed and there is no longer a need to use the research your collected research record will be 






What are my responsibilities during the study?  
Your responsibilities include attending the interview and observation sessions, asking questions 
about anything that you do not understand following the researcher’s instructions and reporting 
to the researcher any worries or discomforts.  
 
If I agree to participate in this study, will I be informed of any new risks that may be found 
during the course of this study?  
Yes. You will immediately be informed if any new information becomes available during the 
study that could cause you to change your mind about participating or that is important to your 
health or safety.  
 
What are the potential benefits of the study?  
The researcher cannot guarantee that you will benefit from participation in this study.  However, 
your contributions may help emergency personnel attain a better understanding of the potential 
benefits of adopting human-AI technologies in emergency room procedures as well as provide 
any insights into the general concern of human error in safety-critical industries.  
 
What options are available if I decide not to take part in this research study?  
Not participating in this study will not impact upon your professional view, station or rank in any 
form.  
 
If I agree to take part in this research study, can I be removed from the study without my 
consent? 
Yes. The researcher may decide to take you off this study if the researcher believes that 
participation is no longer safe for you or if you are unable or not willing to follow the 
researcher’s instructions.  
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
Information about you that is collected for this study will remain confidential, unless you give 
your permission to share it with others or if the researcher is required by law to release it.  
 
Will data collected from me be used for any other research? 
Yes. Your de-identified information could be used for future research without additional 
informed consent. 
 
Whom do I call if I have questions or problems? 
For questions about the study contact Sarah Dyer on sarahkd@illinois.edu or Dr. Norma 





research participant contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office on 
(217-333-2670).  
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM TO KEEP 
 
Your signature below certifies the following: 
 
• You have read or been read the information provided above. 
• You have received answers to all of your questions and have been told who to call if you 
have any more questions. 
• You have freely and generously decided to participate in this research. 















Witness’s Name (printed) 
 
__________________________________ 






















APPENDIX D: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW: ROUND ONE 
 
Research Topic:  
 
HUMAN ERROR AND INTERACTIONS WITH TECHNOLOGY IN SAFETY-
CRITICAL WORKPLACES: LEARNING FROM THE AVIATION INDUSTRY 
 
The main overarching question that guides my inquiry:  
To what extent do technologies help or hinder humans from making human errors in 
safety-critical workplaces?  
The three sub-questions: 
1. What types of errors do humans make when performing high consequence tasks? 
2. How does technology address those different types of errors? 
3. How does the safety-critical organization address those different types of errors? 
 
Introduction: I am particularly interested in the experiences of individuals who work in safety-
critical industries like Aviation.  More specifically, I am interested in their experiences with 
human error.  In addition, I am interested to learn more about the interaction of humans with 
technologies, and what impact that might have on human error. 
I define a human error as either an execution failure such as a slip or a lapse in judgement or a 
planning failure such as not being aware of a rule or a knowledge-based mistake in your 
organization.  These are all unintentional, unplanned human errors. I am not interested in 
deliberate acts or violations. 
Is there anything that you would like to ask me at this point? 
Questions: 
1. For the purposes of this interview, please identify an incident that occurred to you or that 
you witnessed while you were involved in a high consequence task and a human error 
occurred. 
2. Describe the incident in as much detail as possible. 
3. How would you describe the source of the problem in this incident?  
4. Describe your initial reactions or responses to this incident. 
5. Describe your secondary reactions or responses to this incident. 
6. Describe the steps that you took to address the incident. 
7. Describe the steps that someone else took to address the incident. 
8. What lessons did you learn from this experience? 
9. Describe the training that you have received specifically related to this incident?  
10. Did any kind of technology like automation or AI assist in the incident? 








• As you look back now on the incident what do you think happened? 
• Was there anything in that particular scenario that could now be addressed with training 
to prevent it re-occurring? 
• What suggestions do you have for future workers who may encounter this incident? 
• Is there anything else that you would like to make a comment on? 
• What has it been like to talk about your experience? 
 


































APPENDIX E: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW: ROUND TWO  
 
Research Topic:  
HUMAN ERROR AND INTERACTIONS WITH TECHNOLOGY IN SAFETY-
CRITICAL WORKPLACES: LEARNING FROM THE AVIATION INDUSTRY 
 
The main overarching question that guides my inquiry:  
To what extent do technologies help or hinder humans from making human errors in 
safety-critical workplaces?  
The three sub-questions: 
1. What types of errors do humans make when performing high consequence tasks? 
2. How does technology address those different types of errors? 




I am particularly interested in the experiences of individuals who work in safety-critical 
workplaces.  More specifically, I am interested in their experiences with human error.  In 
addition, I am interested in the reduction of human error through the use of technologies like 
automation. During our last interview, I asked you to recall a situation in your department when 
an incident took place that involved human error. I asked you a series of questions about your 
experiences during that particular instance.  
 
In addition to the data gathered from the interviews in the first round and an observation of you 
working on one of your shifts I have analyzed the data and generated some questions and some 
themes.  During this second interview today, I will present a summary of these themes to you for 
further clarification and if required, modification. I also have some specific questions about some 
events that occurred on your shift during my observation phase.  




1. As you look back on our first interview and my observations, is there anything that stands 
out in your 
mind? 
2. Is there anything that you would like to add to our previous discussion about human error 
and working in your department?  
3. During our first interview you described your experiences and training in human factors. 
Would you mind saying more about: 





4. Additional themes emerged from other interviews conducted during the first round. 
Would you mind sharing your thoughts about: 
- (specific themes identified during data analysis of first interview & observation) 
5. What do you think are the most important elements surrounding risk, safety and human 
error in your workplace?  
6. Is there anything else that you think would be helpful for me to know to understand 
human error and working with technology and machines in your workplace?  
7. Is there anything else that you would like to ask me? 





















APPENDIX F: PRIVATE FIELD JOURNAL PROCESS NOTES EXAMPLE 
 Thoughts  Feelings  Impressions  Questions  
I think I need to 
follow up with this 
participant next time 
and talk to him 
about his experience 
in the tool crib.  
He seems to have a 
lot of knowledge in 
heavy power tools 
and experience with 
training others.  He 
appears to have 
respect in the 
workshop but gets 
sidetracked with 
certain social-
political agendas.  
I don’t think the 
other staff have his 
level of training.  
What is his training? 
Is this training 
offered to the staff 
here?  
How is his view 
different from his 
colleagues with 





















APPENDIX G: OBSERVATION GRID OR NOTES 
OBSERVER NAME 
  














 NUMBER OF OTHER 
PARTICIPANTS 
DURING SHIFT  
 
1. Task performed 
 
 
Time started task   Breaks during task  
Time finished task  Time pressure  
Number of years of 
experience completing 
task 
 Training Required 






Description of safety 
procedure followed 
 
Description of PPE   
Complexity Of Task 






Description of other 
co-workers/subjects 






Length of Shift   
Position of Participant 
in Roster (E.g. coming 
off nights onto days)  
 
Any malfunctions of 
machine or technology 
 
Any critical incident 
that emerges 
 











APPENDIX I: SKR BASED ERRORS FROM INCIDENT REPORTS  
 
# ID #  Date of 
Incident  
Description of INCIDENT  
 
 
SKILL BASED ERRORS (#17) 
Pilot related Incident reports 
1.  (6) 19/2/19 Student pilot on solo failed to listen carefully to ATC and flight 
instructor communication, and was unsuccessful on visual on another 
aircraft and continued an early turn into path of another aircraft on 
runway resulting in a near miss. Failed situational observance. 
Student not to fly solo until further notice. Debrief and alert student.  
 
2.  (19) 27/4/19 Student pilot pushed an aircraft into a hangar wall during a manual 
maneuver.  Student was positioning aircraft at the end of the flight. 
Aircraft repaired with new skins, paint plus balance and ops checked.  
 
3.  (32) 09/10/19 Student pilot during a landing ignored suggestion for a go around and 
ballooned the aircraft, it pitched up, tail hit the runway resulting in 
tail strike. Student tried to recover which caused it to pitch up and 
fail. Debrief surrounding events and talk of “go around” review. Nil 
defects on aircraft reported.  
Engineer related Incident reports 
4.  (7)  22/11/19 Engineers repositioned an aircraft during maintenance in the hangar. 
They then found this live aircraft left unattended with its magnetos 
left on for an extended period of time after being repositioned in the 
hangar  
 
5.  (20) 08/05/19 Apprentice Engineer, after inspection, cleaning and during re-installing 
a fuel filter, fuel spilt covering an apprentice engineer. Rinsed 
affected area with water until fuel diluted. Returned to work 
unaffected. Needs reminding about dangerous goods.  
 
6.  (18) 20/03/19 Engineer slipped while fitting a wing fairing between wing strut and 
main landing wheel taking a step backwards landing heavily on a 
straight arm to break the fall. He fell backwards and instinctively put 
his arm out and sustained internal bruising. Full responsibility was 
taken over misplacement. Human factors to be sole issue. Sick leave 






7.  (15) 21/03/19 Engineer Dust and debris falling into engineers’ eyes whilst removing 
attic balustrade with no PPE apparent. Engineer remained at work. 
No glasses worn during task. Topic raised for ops meeting.  
 
8.  (14) 07/03/19 During compression testing a single engineer held a propeller blade 
whilst bringing on air pressure on the aircraft. Safety manager 
suggestions to make this a highly critical mandatory two-person task. 
Nearly resulted in a blade strike or blade kick back. No injury 
reported.  
 
9.  (13) 05/03/19 Tow bar left attached after parking an aircraft. Workshop needs to be 
reset every Friday. Needs end of day checklist.  
 
10.  (8) 25/02/19 Apprentice engineer (3rd year) towed aircraft out of hangar, turning too 
sharply and hit the left-hand wing tip of the aircraft on the hangar 
door. Left hand wingtip strobe aluminum bracket bent. Damage to 
aircraft minimal. 
 
11.  (3) 01/02/19 Engineer fell after losing position on ladder and fell from an elevated 
position. Lost position on a step. 
12.  (12) 01/03/19 Gas bottle area is undefined gas bottles left in various and incorrect 
storage locations 
 
13.  (34) 22/11/19 Aircraft inadequately tied down in extreme weather conditions with 
insufficient access to chains and loops, lack of fully operational tie 
down points, the chains are missing links so unable to connect 
properly. Moving in strong winds.  
 
14.  (16) 21/03/19 Hangar doors popped off runners required two engineers to correct 
resulting in back injuries from over-exertion 
15.  
(17) 22/03/19 Hangar door jammed on track over-exertion by engineers to correct it  
 
16.  (28) 12/09/19 Hangar door jammed on track plus slippery floor during wet weather 
over exertion to correct it  
 
17.  
(36) 27/11/19 Hangar doors north facing difficult to move causing over exertion 
RULE BASED ERRORS (#6) 
Engineer related Incident Reports 
18.  (35) 22/11/19 Engineer incorrectly filled auxiliary fuel tanks instead of main fuel 
tanks. Called Air BP for main tanks to be filled but there was no 
change on tanks but aux fuel tanks had been filled completely. 










19.  (7) 20/2/19 Engineer carried out fueling within the hangar  
Fueling operation in exclusion zone  
20.  (11) 01/03/19 Transferring and storing quantity of fuel being stored in the hangar 
exceeded storage guidelines.  
 
21.  (24) 13/07/19 Engineer not changing and replacing a tire correctly for maintenance 
that was clearly underserviced and required replacing with a new one 
due to significant wear and tear left main tire blew disabling the 
aircraft on the runway 
 
22.  (29) 12/09/19  Tire ordered using correct part number but supplier sent incorrect 
number. Tube tyre part not fitted but Engineer reordered new part. 
23.  (27) 12/09/19 Engineers misunderstood apprentice records not clear handovers 
difficulty using no confidence in system. 
KNOWLEDGE BASED ERRORS (#4) 
Pilot related Incident Reports 
24.  (21) 21/06/19 Student pilots in close proximity to live active aircraft during training. 
Multiple persons airside.  
 
25.  (25) 01/08/19 Student pilots involved in excessive number of aircraft maneuvers in 
ATC area for dual circuit activity. Not flying standard patterns.  
26.  (4) 04/02/19 Student pilots demonstrating lack of external communication with other 
aircraft, ATC with poor verification of location on runway. Runway 
incursion not apparent yet landed on runway to hard stop. Near miss.  
27.  (26)  22/08/19 Student Pilots unaware of Chain of Communication in emergencies 
Hazards (#4) 
28.  (10) 28/02/19 Slippery when wet sign needed in reception and kitchen area 
29.  (37)  27/11/19 Coffee water filter has moldy smell 
30.  (9) 28/02/19 Step in kitchen and crew room needs highlighting  
31.  (1)  25/9/19  Bird/wildlife around Mt Cootha. Slight damage to aircraft.  
Entered in Error (#2) 
32.  (30) 2/10/19 Entered in error aircraft grounded.  
33.  (5) 12/02/19 Entered in error ladder used incorrectly 
